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Abstract 
This work examines the existence of heterogeneity in the impact of issues on vote 
choice in the American electorate. I begin by explaining the reasons for studying het-
erogeneity in issue weights from both a methodological and substantive perspective. 
In Chapter 2 I examine the aggregate effect of heterogeneity in costs of information 
on the measures of issue salience derived from spatial models of voting. I find some 
evidence that individuals who are uncertain about candidate issue positions do bias 
these estimates, but the resulting bias is slight in the aggregate. However, the results 
of this chapter are suggestive, indicating that different voters may use issues differ-
ently or not at all, depending on their costs of information. In order to examine this 
possibility further, individual measures of issue salience must be developed. Chapter 
3 explores the utility of using survey questions about issue salience as the solution to 
this problem. Unfortunately, most of the survey questions currently employed do not 
prove to be useful in determining issue salience in spatial models of voting. Thus, 
Chapter 4 attempts to determine individual level issue salience indirectly, using a 
method that employs rank-ordered data to estimate separate issue weights for each 
individual on each issue. I find a clear relationship between issue salience and costs 
of information, with those individuals who face higher costs of information being less 
likely to place weight on any given issue or consider multiple issues when deciding 
who to vote for. Although I am able to employ this technique to learn a great deal 
about the relationship between issue salience and the costs of information, this tech-
nique is not suited for most datasets. Therefore, in Chapter 5 I develop a model that 
allows for heterogeneity in issue weights, but is more widely applicable to the kind 
of data generally available for studying American elections. I again find evidence of 
heterogeneity in the impact of issues on vote choice in the American electorate and 
the role that costs of information play in determining issue salience. Finally, I con-
clude, discussing my findings and the implications they have for the political process 
in the United States. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The impact of candidate issue positions on the behavior of voters in the United States 
has been a topic of debate in political science for decades. Much of the early empirical 
work in political science has focused on this topic, although the link between the public 
and government was examined long before this (Lippman 1922; Mills 1956). These 
early studies were overwhelmingly negative, concluding that the average American 
voter does not base his or her voting decision on the issue positions of the candidates 
in the election. 
In The American Voter Campbell et al. (1960) discuss three conditions that must 
hold if the issue positions of candidates are to have an impact on an individuals vote 
choice. They are: (1) the issue must be cognized in some form, (2) the issue must 
arouse some minimal intensity of feeling, and (3) there must be a perception that 
one party or candidate better represents the voter's position on the issue that does 
the other. Their general conclusion is that most voters are unable to meet these 
three criteria, and thus issues carry little weight in the decision rules of voters. Other 
empirical work from this era supported this conclusion (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and 
Gaudet 1944; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954). 
Many scholars have questioned the conclusions drawn from this research (Key 
1966; Pamper 1972). However, the most striking contrast to the conclusions of The 
American Voter has been the success of the spatial model of voting (Davis, Hinich, and 
Ordeshook 1970; Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich 1984). The spatial model of voting 
posits that an individual casts his or her vote for the candidate that holds positions 
on the issues that are closest to his or her own positions. Thus most empirical 
models that test the impact of issues in elections do so by determining the relationship 
between the proximity of candidates to voters on issues and vote behavior, with issue 
proximity and vote choice measured with survey data. Most studies that employ 
the spatial model of voting have found strong statistical relationships between issue 
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proximity and vote choice, indicating that candidate issue positions are taken under 
consideration by voters. 
How then do we account for these markedly different findings? Are voters unable 
to use the issue positions of candidates in their vote decisions as the low levels of 
information discovered in The American Voter would suggest, or do candidate issue 
positions have an impact on vote behavior, as numerous studies that have employed 
the spatial model of voting have found? 
Some researchers have expressed concern that the strong relationship between 
issue proximity as measured by surveys and vote choice might not indicate a causal 
relationship. For example, Conover and Feldman (1989) posit that survey respondents 
infer where to place candidates on issue placement scales based on other information 
and thus placement on these scales does not indicate knowledge of candidate issue 
positions. Similarly, the possibility of projection effects reduces confidence in the 
strong relationship uncovered between issue proximity and vote choice (Brody and 
Page 1972; Page and Brody 1972). This line of reasoning postulates that voters 
first form preferences for candidates based on non-policy concerns and then place 
themselves and their preferred candidates close together on the issue placement scales. 
Again, this would create the illusion of a relationship between issue proximity and 
vote choice when none exists. Without further evidence the spatial model of voting 
alone cannot resolve the debate. 
Merely demonstrating a correlation between issue proximity as measured on sur-
veys and vote choice is not enough to prove that candidate issue positions have an 
impact on vote choice. In addition, we must demonstrate that there exist differences 
across individuals in the use of issues that are related to variables associated with pos-
sible issue voting. If the strong relationship between issue proximity and candidate 
choice is just the result of individuals projecting preferred issue positions onto can-
didates, then this effects should be relatively constant across individuals and across 
issues. However, if individuals really do place weight on issues when voting, then we 
should observe differences in the impact of issues on vote choice both across individu-
als (some people use issues and others do not) and across issues (different people care 
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about different issues). An early indication of this possibility was the examination 
of "issue publics" by Converse (1964), who found that while many individuals were 
disinterested in the issues at stake in an election, on any given issue there was a sub-
set of individuals who were aware of the issue and considered it when thinking about 
politics. Therefore, if we can uncover heterogeneity in the impact of issues on vote 
choice then this lends additional weight to the arguments advanced by the spatial 
model of voting - the issue positions of candidates do have an impact on individual 
vote behavior. 
Thus the study of heterogeneity in the impact of issues on vote choice is necessary 
if we are to completely understand the role of issues in elections. The implications of 
heterogeneity in issue salience for the study of elections are both methodological and 
substantive. Methodologically, a failure to account for heterogeneity in issue salience 
can have serious implications in our models, such as coefficient bias. Substantively, a 
failure to understand heterogeneity in issue salience can lead to incorrect inferences 
about electoral outcomes and voter behavior. I discuss each of these possibilities 
below. 
Most studies of the impact of issues on vote choice ignore the possibility of hetero-
geneity in issue weights. These studies instead attempt to determine the "average" 
impact of issues on vote choice. However, if one of the coefficients in the model is het-
erogeneous and correlated with one of the regressors, then all coefficients in the model 
will be biased. This means that even estimates of the impact of partisan identification 
and demographic characteristics are subject to bias. This pattern of heterogeneity 
is very plausible in models of vote choice. For example, if the weight an individual 
places on an issue is related to his or her position on an issue (such as an extremist 
on an issue placing more weight on that issue when voting), then there will be bias 
in all coefficient estimates unless the heterogeneity in issue weights is accounted for. 
As most models that relate issue proximity to vote choice are non-linear, the im-
pact of heterogeneity in issue salience on coefficient estimates will be unpredictable. 
Thus, accounting for heterogeneity in the impact of issues on vote choice is vital to 
estimating the impact of any factor on vote choice. 
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Failure to understand heterogeneity in the impact of issues on vote choice also 
obscures our substantive understanding of electoral outcomes and voter behavior. 
Figure 1.1 represents a simple two-dimensional issue space of the type hypothesized 
by the spatial model of voting. There are two issues that comprise this space - Issue 
1 and Issue 2. A voter's or a candidate's point in the space can be projected to either 
axis to determine what position he or she holds on either issue. For instance, the 
voter depicted in figure 1.1 has an identical position to Candidate 1 on Issue 1, and 
an identical position to Candidate 2 on Issue 2. 
Figure 1.1 Here 
In the spatial model of voting, the voter considers the distance between him or herself 
and the candidates in the election, and casts a vote for that candidate closest to his or 
her ideal point (the black dot labeled "Voter"). Let us assume that the voter is only 
concerned with these two issues. Under the homogeneity assumption usually imposed 
on the estimation of spatial models of voting, each issue is equally important to the 
voter. Thus, the most preferred candidate is the one who is the closest overall to the 
voter's ideal point. The circle in figure 1.1 represents one of the voter's indifference 
curves - all points along the circle are equally distant from the voter, and thus all 
equally preferred. Candidate 1 falls within this indifference contour, while Candidate 
2 is outside it. Thus, if both issues are equally important to this voter, he or she will 
prefer Candidate 1 over Candidate 2. 
However, what if all issues are not equally important to this voter? For example, 
let us assume that for this voter, Issue 2 is more important than Issue 1. The flattened 
ellipse in figure 1 represents one possible shape of this voter's indifference curves if 
this is true. All points on this ellipse are equally attractive to the voter. Notice that 
the axis of the ellipse is greater along Issue 1 than along Issue 2. This indicates that 
Issue 2 is more important to the voter than Issue 1, as a position a particular distance 
on Issue 2 from the voter's ideal point is less attractive than the same distance on 
Issue 1. This has implications for voter behavior - with this new decision rule the 
voter now prefers Candidate 2 over Candidate 1. Thus heterogeneity in issue weights 
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has implications for voter behavior and electoral outcomes. 
Obviously, studying this heterogeneity is important for our understanding of these 
issues. Below I develop an "ideal" model of vote choice that would give us all of the 
information necessary to fully understant heterogeneity in the impact of issues on 
vote choice. I will also briefly discuss strategies for empirically estimating this model. 
I will first construct a theoretical model of vote choice without regard to empirical 
tractability. I utilize a spatial model of voting, where the utility that a voter would 
receive from a candidate is determined by a weighted sum of the distances between 
that candidate's positions on the issues and the voter's ideal points on the issues. 
Determining what these weights are will tell us what impact each issue had on the 
voter's decision. 
Let the utility that voter i would get from voting for candidate c be given by: 
(1.1) 
where Uic is the utility yielded by candidate c to voter i, Xie is a vector of the distances 
between candidate c and voter ion the issues, and Eic represents unobserved factors 
that affect Uic· f3i is a vector of the weights that voter i assigns to each issue. The 
elements of f3i tell us how important each issue was to voter i when voting. Our goal 
is to estimate the elements of f3i and thus the impact of each issue on the vote decision 
of voter i. 
Voter i will vote for the candidate that yields him or her the greatest utility. To 
determine this voter i must compare the utility that he or she would receive from 
each of the candidates. Such a comparison is given in equation 1.2. 
(1.2) 
The utility yielded by candidate c is at least as great as the utility yielded by candidate 
d, which implies that the weighted issue positions of candidate c (plus unobserved 
factors) give voter i at least as much utility as the weighted issue positions of candidate 




A number of discrete choice models can be set up with this formulation, depending 
on the distributional assumption we make about the unobserved portions of utility c;ic 
and E:id· For instance, assuming that the unobserved portions of utility are distributed 
IID Type I Extreme Value across voters leads to a conditional logit model. Thus the 
probability that voter i would vote for candidate c out of a choice set of k candidates 
is given by: 
Pr(votei = c) 
eXicf3i 
L:k eX;kf3i (1.4) 
Note that this equation differs from the usual conditional logit specification in that 
the parameter f3 is allowed to be unique for each voter i. Estimating /Ji involves 
the estimation of a conditional logit, with voter i's vote choice as the dependent 
variable and the distances between voter i and the k candidates on the issues as the 
independent variables. If we could obtain /Ji for voter i it would tell us the impact 
each issue had on the vote choice of voter i. 
Unfortunately, such an empirical model is not identified. Voter i makes one vote 
choice, which gives us one observation. With this observation we are attempting to 
estimate /Ji, which is a vector with a number of elements equal to the number of issues 
we have included in our model. Quite simply, when we attempt to estimate this model 
we are attempting to estimate more parameters than there are observations in our 
dataset.1 Adding more voters to our dataset does not improve the situation, as each 
voter has their own unique vector of weights that must be estimated. 
In order to successfully estimate the impact of issues on vote choice, some re-
strictions must be placed on /Ji· The remainder of this thesis addresses four possible 
solutions to this estimation problem. The first solution is to assume that /Ji is homo-
1 Restricting ourselves to a single issue in our model would not help; estimates in that case would 
either tend towards positive infinity if voter i votes for the candidate closest to his or her ideal point 
on the issue, and towards negative infinity if voter i prefers some other candidate. 
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geneous across all voters (/3i = /3). The model in Chapter 2 makes this assumption. 
In Chapter 2 I examine the aggregate effect of heterogeneity in costs of information 
on the measures of issue salience derived from spatial models of voting. The hypoth-
esis is that individuals who are uncertain about candidate issue positions will tend to 
place candidates at the midpoint of survey issue placement scales, thus biasing our 
measures of issue proximity and thus of the effect of issue distance on vote choice. 
Although I do find some evidence of this, the resulting bias is slight in the aggre-
gate. However, the results of this chapter are suggestive, indicating that different 
voters may use issues differently or not at all, depending on their costs of informa-
tion. Unfortunately, this model cannot examine individual level heterogeneity due to 
the homogeneity assumption employed for tractability purposes. 
Another possibility is not to estimate /3i, but to gather this information through 
survey data. Chapter 3 explores the utility of using survey questions about issue 
salience as the solution to this problem. Unfortunately, most of the survey questions 
currently employed do not prove to be useful in determining issue salience in spatial 
models of voting. 
Yet another possibility is to gather more choice data for each individual in the 
sample. With enough observations on each individual it is possible to estimate f3i· 
Chapter 4 employs this principle to determine individual level issue salience. The 
method in Chapter 4 first observes multiple preference choices from among sets of 
candidates by a single voter and then estimates which issue positions the preferred 
candidates have in common. I find a clear relationship between issue salience and 
costs of information, with those individuals who face higher costs of information 
being less likely to place weight on any given issue or consider multiple issues when 
deciding who to vote for. Although I am able to employ this technique to learn a 
great deal about the relationship between issue salience and the costs of information, 
this technique is not suited for most datasets available to political scientists. 
Therefore, in Chapter 5 I develop a model that allows for heterogeneity in issue 
weights, but is more widely applicable to the kind of data generally available for 
studying American elections. This model is random parameters logit, which assumes 
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that /3i is distributed according to some known probability distribution, and estimates 
the mean and variance of that distribution. The mean gives us information about the 
average impact of an issue on vote choice, while the variance is a measure of hetero-
geneity in the impact of that issue on vote choice. I find evidence of heterogeneity in 
the impact of issues on vote choice in the American electorate. Further, there is evi-
dence to suggest that this heterogeneity is also influenced by the costs of information 
imposed by political campaigns. Finally, I conclude, discussing my findings and the 
implications they have for the political process in the United States. 
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Figure 1.1: Indifference Contours in a Spatial Model of Voting with Heterogeneity in 
Issue Salience 
lndiff ere nee Contours in a Spatial 
Model of Voting with Heterogeneity 
in Issue Salience 
Issue 2 
• Candidate 1 
• Voter • Candidate 2 
Issue 1 
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Chapter 2 An Aggregate Look at Heterogeneity 
in Issue Salience and Uncertainty 
Determining the impact of candidate issue positions on vote choice has long been 
a popular research topic in political science. The question is fundamental to our 
understanding of the functioning of democracy: to what extent are election outcomes 
determined by the issues? The dominant research approach to this question has been 
the spatial model of voting (Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook 1970; Downs 1957; Enelow 
and Hinich 1984). The spatial model of voting posits that an individual casts his or 
her vote for the candidate that holds positions on the issues that are closest to his 
or her own positions. Thus most empirical models that test the impact of issues in 
elections do so by determining the relationship between the proximity of candidates 
to voters on issues and vote behavior. 
However, this method necessarily assumes that individuals know the issue po-
sitions of candidates with certainty. Some work has been done on the effects of 
uncertainty about candidate issue positions on vote choice (Alvarez 1997), but very 
little is known about the effects of uncertainty about candidate issue positions on the 
salience of issues to voters and on our estimates of the impact of issues on vote choice. 
This chapter addresses the possibility that respondent uncertainty about candi-
date issue positions leads to heterogeneity in issue weights and biases our estimates 
of the impact of issues on vote choice. Most empirical estimates of spatial models of 
voting measure the effect of distance between voters and candidates on vote choice. 
This distance is usually measured as the difference between the voter's self-placement 
on an issue placement scale and the position of the candidate on this scale. The 
"true" position of the candidate for these models is generally calculated as the mean 
placement of the candidate by all respondents on the scale. The tendency of uncer-
tain individuals to place candidates at the midpoint of issue placement scales biases 
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our estimates of the "true" positions of candidates, thus affecting our estimates of 
distances on issues between voters and candidates and our estimates of the impact 
of this distance on vote choice. This potential bias is especially troubling since those 
individuals who are guessing and affecting estimates of issue salience are among those 
least likely to use issues to determine candidate preference. 
The tendency of uncertain individuals to place candidates at the midpoint of these 
issue placement scales indicates that many are guessing, and share more in common 
with those individuals who answer "don't know" to the issue placement question and 
are treated as missing data. In this chapter I determine the difference between a 
spatial voting model that is estimated in the usual way, and a model where uncertain 
individuals are treated as missing data for purposes of calculating the "true" position 
of candidates and the impact of issues on vote choice. The omission of uncertain 
individuals has little effect on the empirical estimates of the spatial voting model. 
This indicates that while the models that are currently used to determine the impact 
of issues on vote choice are robust, they are not useful for determining heterogeneity in 
the impact of issues on vote choice due to uncertainty. The homogeneity assumption 
common to nearly every model of vote choice, including the models in this chapter, 
do not allow us to study heterogeneity in the impact of issues on vote choice. 
The next section discusses the possibility that uncertain individuals could in-
troduce bias into our estimates of the "true" positions of candidates, and thus our 
estimates of the effect of these positions on vote behavior. Section 2 finds evidence of 
this bias empirically, but discovers that this bias is very slight. Section 3 concludes, 
discussing the robustness of the spatial voting model and its inability to uncover 
heterogeneity in issue salience due to uncertainty. 
12 
2.1 Uncertainty in the Measurement of Candidate 
Issue Positions 
The spatial model of voting hypothesizes that the utility voter i would get from voting 
for candidate j is given by: 
(2.1) 
where Uij is the utility yielded by candidate j to voter i, vi is a vector of voter i's 
positions on various issues, Cj is a vector of candidate j's positions on various issues, 
a is a vector of the weight (or salience) that voter i assigns to each issue, and kij 
are non-issue factors that affect utility. Each voter evaluates this function for every 
candidate in the election and votes for that candidate who yields the highest utility. 
In order to estimate the impact of issues in such a model empirically we require 
three pieces of information.1 We need a measure of the voter's vote decision, the 
voter's positions on the issues, and the candidate's positions on the issues. In em-
pirical studies this information is usually derived from survey data. Vote choice or 
vote intention is usually posed to respondents as a direct question; the answer to 
this question is used as the dependent variable in a discrete choice model. To deter-
mine the positions of voters and candidates on issues most academic surveys employ 
issue placement scales. Issue placement scales present the survey respondent with 
an ordinal scale, with one endpoint representing one policy extreme and the other 
endpoint representing the other policy extreme. Respondents are then asked to place 
themselves and candidates on this ordinal scale according to their beliefs about which 
position they and the candidates hold on the issue. 
1 Actually, there is a fourth piece of information necessary - the correct metric to measure 
distance between the candidate and the voter. Here, as in most studies of the impact of issues on 
vote choice I square the difference between the candidate and the voter on the issue scale when 
calculating distance. Although this metric performs well empirically, there are several assumptions 
built into this distance measure, such as risk aversion. However, to my knowledge there has not been 
any attempt to systematically examine the merits of various distance measures in spatial models of 
voting. Thus I will follow convention and use the squared difference between the voter's position 
and the candidate's position as the measure of distance between the voter and the candidate. 
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The resulting empirical model is a discrete choice model, with vote choice as 
the dependent variable and the distance between each vote and each candidate as 
independent variables. Estimation of this model yields an estimate of a for each 
issue, which is interpreted as the weight or salience attached to each issue by voters. 
The greater the weight attached to an issue by voters, the greater the impact of this 
issue on vote choice. At issue here is how respondent uncertainty about the placement 
of candidates on the issue placement scales can affect estimates of issue salience; that 
is, how much does measurement error in Cj affect our estimates of a? 
The question of how to determine each voter's actual position on the issue di-
mension has been largely ignored in the empirical literature. Most studies treat the 
respondent's self-placement on issue scales as an accurate representation of the indi-
vidual's true ideal point on the issue. However, the literature on attitude instability 
brings this assumption into question (e.g., Converse 1964). I will not address that 
question here, and will treat the respondent's self-placement on each issue placement 
scale as an unbiased estimate of his or her ideal point on each issue in this dissertation. 
Also required are the positions of the candidates on each issue. The most obvious 
way to determine this is to use each survey respondent's placement of the candidate 
on the issue placement scale as their perception of the position of the candidate on the 
issue and calculate issue distances by squaring the difference between the respondent's 
self-placement and his or her placement of the candidate. This measurement strategy 
is appealing, since it is the voter's perception of the candidate's positions on the 
issues relative to his or her own that determines the impact of issues on vote choice. 
However, calculating issue distances using each voter's perception of where candidates 
are located in the issue space is likely to bias estimates of the impact of issues on vote 
choice upwards, due to an effect termed "projection." While in the spatial model of 
voting, individuals are aware of each candidate's position on all issues; in reality voters 
often have imperfect information about the true issue positions of the candidates they 
are considering. Individuals who are ignorant of the issue positions of the candidate 
they prefer for non-policy reasons may infer that their preferred candidate is the 
closest to them on the issues. Essentially, these individuals first form a preference 
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for a candidate and then "project" their ideal issue positions onto that candidate 
due to a lack of information about that candidate's true issue positions. For these 
individuals the impact of issues on vote choice is zero, yet observationally we see a 
high correlation between minimal issue distances and vote choice. Any estimates of 
the impact of issues on vote choice will thus be biased upwards. This phenomenon is 
well documented in the voter behavior literature (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 
1954; Brody and Page 1972; Markus and Converse 1979; Page and Brody 1972; Page 
and Jones 1979). Thus, a voter may observe that a candidate is close to him or her on 
many issues and thus prefer that candidate, or he or she may prefer that candidate 
for unrelated reasons and thus believe that this candidate must also agree with him 
or her on issues about which the voter has little or no information. Unfortunately, 
with issue placement scales both of these possibilities are observationally equivalent. 
One method commonly employed to minimize projection effects is to calculate 
the "true" position of the candidate on the issue scale by the mean placement of the 
candidate on the issue scale by all respondents. It is hoped that projection effects 
and other errors in the perception of the candidate's issue position are distributed 
symmetrically and will thus cancel each other out in the aggregate, leaving the mean of 
all placements as a relatively unbiased estimate of the actual position of the candidate. 
Issue distances are then calculated as the squared difference between the respondent's 
self-placement on the issue placement scale and the mean placement of the candidate 
on the issue placement scale by all respondents. Since issue distances are no longer 
calculated using the respondent's placement of the candidate, but the fixed "true" 
position of the candidate, projection effects are minimized. 
However, even this method of calculating issue distances is subject to bias due 
to respondent uncertainty. Although most issue placement scales include a filter 
question to screen out respondents who have no knowledge of the candidate's issue 
position, undoubtedly some uncertain respondents slip through and merely guess as 
to the location of the candidate on the scale. As long as this guessing is random, this 
will have no effect on the calculation of the mean placement of the candidate on the 
scale. However, studies of respondent placements of candidates on issue placement 
15 
scales has revealed that uncertain individuals (measured through education or survey 
questions) tend to place candidates at the midpoint of issue placement scales (Alvarez 
and Franklin 1994, 1999; Brady and Sniderman 1991; Sniderman, Glaser, and Griffin 
1991). If we believe that these uncertain individuals have less information about 
the candidate's "true" position on the issue placement scale, or are guessing, then 
clearly this violates the assumption that errors in perceptions of candidate positions 
are symmetrical. The presence of uncertain individuals will bias our estimates of 
the "true" position of the candidate towards the midpoint of the scale. This in turn 
will bias estimates of issue salience upwards in a moderate electorate by erroneously 
minimizing the distance between a candidate and his or her moderate supporters. 
Explanations for the tendency of uncertain respondents to place candidates at the 
midpoint of the issue placement scales include uncertain respondents making a "safe" 
guess (Brady and Sniderman 1991) and uncertain respondents reporting the mean 
of a distribution of possible positions of the candidate that includes the entire issue 
placement scale (Alvarez and Franklin 1994, 1999). Whatever the case, the tendency 
for uncertain respondents to favor the midpoint of the issue placement scales indicates 
that many of these respondents are guessing at the actual position of the candidate, 
despite the presence of a "don't know" filter question before the issue placement scale 
in many cases. If these respondents had been screened out by the "don't know" 
filter, their guesses would not enter into the calculation of the mean position of the 
candidate. Thus, since these respondents who guess at the placement of the candidate 
have no more knowledge of the candidate's issue position than those respondents who 
answer "don't know," an appropriate strategy might be to treat them as missing data 
when calculating the mean placement of the candidate on the issue placement scale. 
This would eliminate the bias towards the midpoint induced by uncertainty, giving a 
more accurate placement of the candidate on the issue scale. 
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2.2 An Empirical Test of the Effect of Uncertainty 
on Estimates of Salience 
To test the possibility that respondent uncertainty introduces bias into our estimates 
of issue salience, I use the 1996 National Election Study. The original sample consisted 
of 1714 adults interviewed in the nine weeks prior to the election on November 5. Like 
all National Election Studies since 1968, the 1996 study included a number of issue 
placement scales that are commonly utilized to estimate spatial models of voting. A 
typical example of these scales is the following: 
Some people think the government should provide fewer services even in areas such 
as health and education in order to reduce spending. Suppose these people are at one 
end of a scale, at point 1. Other people feel it is important for the government to 
provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. Suppose these 
people are at the other end, at point 7. And of course, some other people have opinions 
somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6. 
Respondents were asked to place themselves and various political entities on these 
scales, including Clinton, Dole, and Perot. With these scales a spatial model of voting 
can be estimated in the manner described in the previous section. 
However, for the first time the National Election Study also included questions 
designed to measure a respondent's level of uncertainty in their placement of can.di-
dates on these 7-point scales. All of the respondents who placed a candidate on the 
7-point scale were then asked about their certainty of this placement with the fol-
lowing question: "How certain are you about this [placement]? Very certain, pretty 
certain, or not very certain?" Past research has confirmed that questions such as 
these seem to be well-understood to survey respondents, and correlate highly with 
variables that are typically used to measure the costs of information about political 
candidates to voters (Alvarez and Franklin 1994, 1999). Thus we may be reasonably 
certain that the uncertainty questions that follow each issue placement are actually 
capturing each respondent's uncertainty about the issue position of the candidate. 
I first test the hypothesis that uncertain respondents will tend to use the midpoint 
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of the 7-point scale more frequently than certain respondents. To do this I split 
the respondents who placed a candidate on an issue scale into two groups - the 
certain (those who stated that they were "very certain" or "pretty certain" about 
their placement of the candidate on the 7-point scale) and the uncertain (those who 
stated that they were "uncertain" about their placement of the candidate). Figure 
2.1 presents the percentage of each group of respondents at each point of the 7-point 
scale which asked respondents to place Clinton on the "level of government services" 
issue. 
Figure 2.1 Here 
The differences in placement on this scale between the two groups are striking. 
The distribution of uncertain respondents is clearly centered closer to the midpoint of 
the scale (mean = 4.325), relative to the distribution of certain respondents (mean = 
5.073) - these distributions are statistically distinct (x2 = 133.130, significant at p 
0.01.). Higher numbers on this scale represent increased levels of government services, 
so the placement of Clinton on this side of the midpoint by the certain respondents 
seems logical. However, notice that nearly one-third of uncertain respondents place 
Clinton at the midpoint of the 7-point scale. In light of the discussion of the previous 
section, it seems possible that many of these uncertain individuals have no more 
knowledge of Clinton's issue positions that those who answered "don't know" to the 
placement question, yet attempted a placement anyway - quite often at the midpoint 
of the scale. 
Table 2.1 reveals that the differences between certain and uncertain respondents in 
the placement of candidates on the 7-point scales is not unique to the case illustrated 
in figure 2.1. The x2 statistics presented in table 2.1 reveal that the distributions of 
placements for certain and uncertain respondents are statistically distinct for every 
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candidate and every issue for which the certainty questions are available. 
Table 2.1 Here 
In every case, the distribution of the uncertain respondent placements has a mean 
closer to the midpoint of the 7-point scale than does the distribution of the certain 
respondents. This means that for each one of these scales, the mean placement of the 
candidate by all respondents will be closer to the midpoint than the mean placement 
of the candidate by only the certain respondents. The mean candidate placement by 
all respondents and by only the certain respondents is presented in table 2.2, along 
with t-tests for means. 
Table 2.2 Here 
In every instance the mean placement of the candidate is closer to the midpoint 
of the scale when uncertain individuals are included in the calculation and further 
from the midpoint when we only consider the placements of the certain individuals. 
This difference is statistically significant in four out of five issues for Clinton, all 
five issues for Dole, and three of five issues for Perot. When calculating spatial 
voting models, researchers commonly employ the mean placement of the candidate to 
avoid the bias introduced by projection effects, which are a result of imperfect voter 
information about the candidate. However, it is clear from table 2.2 that simply 
using the mean placement of the candidate does not remove all measurement error 
from our calculation of the "true" position of the candidate. Uncertain individuals 
gravitating towards the midpoint of the scale in their placement of the candidate 
due to a lack of information about the candidate's true issue position significantly 
biases the mean of the placements towards the midpoint, which may bias estimates 
of issue salience upwards for the reasons described in section 2.1. In fact, with the 
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exception of Perot on two issues ("defense spending" and "jobs vs. environment"), the 
mean placements of the candidates for certain respondents were always further from 
the mean self-placements of respondents than were the placements of the candidates 
by all respondents. 2 This suggests that uncertainty in candidate placements biases 
estimates of issue salience upwards by reducing the estimated distance between voters 
and candidates on issues. How large a bias this introduces remains to be seen. 
In order to determine the extent of the bias introduced into estimates of issue 
salience by uncertain respondent placements of candidates on the 7-point issue scales, 
I first estimated two multinomial probit models. Multinomial probit models were 
necessary because the presidential race in 1996 had three strong candidates (Clinton, 
Dole, and Perot). In each of these models I included measures of issue distance on the 
five issues for which the uncertainty questions were available. The first model specified 
issue distances in the usual way for a spatial model of voting - the distance between 
each voter and each candidate on a given issue is measured as the squared difference 
between the voter's self-placement on the 7-point scale and the mean placement of 
the candidate on the 7-point scale by all respondents. The second model replaced 
the mean placement of the candidate by all respondents with the mean placement of 
the candidate by only the uncertain respondents. Since this latter mean is always 
more extreme (further from the midpoint, and almost always further from the mean 
position of voters), I expect issues to have less of an effect on vote choice in this 
second model relative to the first. A number of control variables were also included.3 
The dependent variable was the respondent's stated vote choice. The results of both 
of these multinomial probit models are presented in tables 2.3 and 2.4. 
2The mean self-placements of the respondents were: "ideology" - 4.327, "government services" -
3.892, "defense spending" - 4.022, "aid to blacks" - 4.822, and "jobs vs. the environment" - 3.533. 
3The gender and age variables are dummy variables. The partisanship variables are also dummy 
variables, coded 1 if the individual claimed to identify with the party in question or felt he or she 
leaned towards identifying with that party (in other words, both of the partisanship variables were 
zero in the individual identified themselves as a true independent). Education is a 17-point scale, 
normalized to the 0-1 interval. 
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Tables 2.3 and 2.4 Here 
A comparison of tables 2.3 and 2.4 reveals that both models produce very similar 
results. Each model fits the data well; among the 779 respondents in the dataset, 
46.5% of respondents stated that they voted for Clinton, 45.4% said they voted for 
Dole, and 8.1 % said they voted for Perot. The model with all respondents predicted 
vote shares of 46.5% for Clinton, 45.4% for Dole, and 8.1% for Perot, while the model 
that excluded uncertain respondents from the calculation of candidate issue positions 
predicted vote shares of 46.5% for Clinton, 45.3% for Dole, and 8.1% for Perot. 
However, the coefficient estimates in table 2.4 (the model using the mean candidate 
placement of the certain respondents) are consistently smaller in magnitude than the 
coefficient estimates in table 2.3 (the model using the mean candidate placement of 
all respondents). This is exactly what we would expect to see as candidate positions 
on the issues move away from a majority of voters, but individual vote choice is held 
constant; issues appear to matter less. 
The difference in the impact of issues on vote choice is not obvious from exami-
nation of the coefficients in tables 2.3 and 2.4. In order to determine the difference 
in the salience of issues, I calculated "first difference" estimates for both models. I 
first created a hypothetical voter by setting all of the independent variables to their 
mean or modal values.4 Then by changing the value of a single independent vari-
able I can calculate the effect this variable has on the probability of voting for each 
candidate (the dependent variable). Figure 2.2 graphically presents the results of 
the first difference calculations as I vary the position of Clinton across the "level of 
government services" scale. The ideal point of the hypothetical voter was set to 5 on 
this scale for this simulation. If including uncertain respondents in the calculation of 
the mean positions of candidates does bias our estimates of the impact of issues on 
4Issue distances and education level were set to their mean values. This hypothetical voter was 
male, between 30 and 44, and a Democrat. 
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vote choice upwards, this should be apparent by comparing the probabilities graphed 
out in Figure 2. In particular, the impact of the issue on the probability of the hypo-
thetical voter's support of Clinton should be less for the model that utilizes the mean 
placement of only the certain respondents, resulting in a flatter line than that for the 
model utilizing the mean placement of all respondents (the hypothetical voter should 
penalize Clinton less for deviations from his ideal point in the former case). 
Figure 2.2 Here 
It is apparent from examination of figure 2.2 that the differences in the estimated 
impact of issues on vote choice between the two models are minimal. Although the 
estimated impact of issues on vote choice is less for the model that only uses certain 
respondents to determine the position of Clinton on the "level of government services" 
issue, the estimated probabilities only diverge to a noticeable degree at the far left 
points of the scale, the furthest points from the hypothetical voter's ideal point of 5. 
Another way to examine the differences in the impact of issues on vote choice is 
to calculate changes in predicted vote shares as a candidate moves across an issue 
space, holding all else fixed. In this simulation I calculated the probability of each 
respondent voting for each of the three candidates as I move one of the candidates 
across the issue space from 1 to 7 in increments of 0.02. The larger the impact of 
issues on vote choice, the more dramatic the effect of candidate issue position on 
predicted vote share. Figure 2.3 graphically presents the predicted vote share from 
both models for Clinton as he moves across the "level of government services" scale. 
Figure 2.3 Here 
Just as in the case of the "first difference" calculations in figure 2.2, there is very 
little difference evident in the estimated impact of issues on vote choice between the 
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two models. Although the change in predicted vote share is less for the model that 
only uses certain respondents to place Clinton on this issue (indicated by a flatter 
line), the curves graphed out by the two models are nearly indistinguishable. Again, 
the bias introduced into estimates of the impact of issues on vote choice by uncertain 
respondent's placements of candidates appears to be minimal. 
There is one inconsistency in the calculations presented in figure 2.3. By removing 
uncertain respondents from the calculation of the "true" position of the candidate, 
we are saying that these individuals are too uncertain to know where the candidate 
truly stands. Yet when we calculate vote shares as in figure 2.3, we assume that 
uncertain voters penalize candidates in the same way as certain voters, even though 
we assume that these individuals do not know where the candidate is positioned in the 
issue space. A more accurate depiction of the changes in vote share as the candidate 
moves across the issue space would specify that individuals with no knowledge of the 
candidate's position will not modify their voting behavior in response to a change in 
the candidate's position. This is exactly the kind of heterogeneity we would expect 
to see if costs of information play a role in determining issue salience. 
Vote shares were recalculated for Clinton as he moved across the "level of govern-
ment services" issue, holding the votes of the 114 uncertain voters constant. Thus, 
the effect of changing issue positions of Clinton were only calculated for the remain-
ing 665 certain voters, using the mean placement of Clinton provided by the certain 
respondents.5 The results of this calculation are presented in figure 2.4. 
Figure 2 .4 Here 
The change in predicted vote share when uncertain respondents are assumed not 
to change their votes is slightly flatter than either of the curves graphed out in figure 
5Note that the predicted vote shares for this model were very accurate, just as they were for the 
first two models: 46.33 for Clinton, 45.03 for Dole, and 8. 73 for Perot. 
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2.3, but the differences are slight. Thus it appears that the bias introduced by un-
certain respondent's placements of candidates on estimates of the impact of issues on 
vote choice is slight and poses no substantial problems for estimates of average issue 
salience using spatial voting models. 
2.3 Discussion 
The results of the previous section should be heartening for those researchers who 
utilize spatial models of voting to analyze elections in the aggregate. Both multino-
mial probit models were able to predict vote shares to a very high degree of accuracy. 
These models proved to be very robust to changes in the positions of the candidates 
(figure 2.3) and the removal of some respondents from the dataset (figure 2.4). 
However, this robustness should be of concern to researchers who wish to use 
these types of models to analyze the effect of candidate issue positions on individual 
behavior. Changes in candidate issue positions had almost no effect on vote behav-
ior, although it is possible that the changes in position may have been too small to 
induce a large effect. Another possibility is that the changes in position are roughly 
equal for all candidates, meaning that the relative utility yielded by the candidates 
remains similar. Of greater concern is the remarkable consistency of calculated vote 
shares when uncertain individuals were held constant. Again, the relatively small 
number of uncertain people may have kept changes from becoming obvious, but the 
steady influence of issues on vote choice regardless of how we treat uncertain individ-
uals is strange. Multinomial probit models that included interactive terms between 
uncertainty and issue distance either did not converge or estimated statistically in-
significant interactions. Estimating two separate models greatly reduced the sample 
size for each model and created convergence problems. 
The robustness of the empirical estimation of the spatial model of voting presented 
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here in the face of respondent uncertainty suggests one of three things. Either (1) 
issue voting is unrelated to voter certainty about candidate issue positions, (2) our 
estimates of issue weights are not what we think they are, or (3) a better specification 
of the empirical model is needed. This last point is always a possibility - future 
research will perform this same analysis on different datasets and using different 
specifications of the empirical model. The first possibility does not seem plausible 
given the high level of information necessary to perform the calculations required in 
the spatial model of voting. The second point is possible - perhaps treating the mean 
placement of the candidate as the "true" position of the candidate does not remove 
projection effects and other confounding factors. However, one conclusion is certain: 
models of the type presented in this chapter are unable to reveal heterogeneity in 
issue weights. 
If we are to understand the effects of heterogeneity in issue weights on election 
outcomes, new models need to be developed. The results of this chapter indicate 
that there are differences across voters in their understanding and use of information 
about the issue positions of candidates. However, attempting to adjust for these 
differences at the aggregate level did not reveal any new insights into issue voting 
in the American electorate. To understand heterogeneity in issue salience, we must 
examine the use of issues at the individual level. The next 3 chapters adopt just such 
an individual-level approach by explicitly examining heterogeneity in the impact of 
issues on vote choice. 
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Figure 2.1: Placements of Clinton on Government Services by Certainty 
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Table 2.1: Seven-Point Scale Placements and Respondent Uncertainty 
Issue Clinton Dole Perot 
Ideology 98.42 124.75 70.62 
Government Services 133.13 127.51 100.48 
Defense Spending 73.67 97.29 31.39 
Aid to Blacks 115.61 96.36 89.27 
Jobs vs. Environment 105.68 88.64 23.13 
Nate: Entries are x2 statistics with 6 degrees of freedom. All entries are statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Table 2.2: Mean Placement of Candidates by Certainty 
Seven All Certain T-test for 
Point Scale Respondents Respondents Difference in Means 
Clinton 
Ideology 3.152 3.043 1.933** 
Government Services 4.911 5.073 3.073** 
Defense Spending 3.946 3.891 0.941 
Aid Minorities 3.316 3.188 2.212** 
Jobs vs. Environment 3.471 3.351 2.043** 
Dole 
Ideology 5.148 5.368 4.126** 
Government Services 3.146 2.951 3.781** 
Defense Spending 4.654 4.838 3.427** 
Aid Minorities 4.996 5.192 3.565** 
Jobs vs. Environment 4.546 4.712 2.967** 
Perot 
Ideology 4.486 4.595 1.387* 
Government Services 2.936 2.730 3.269** 
Defense Spending 3.827 3.903 0.569 
Aid Minorities 5.165 5.404 3.531 ** 
Jobs vs. Environment 4.605 4.601 0.033 
Note: ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level, * indicates significance at the 0.10 
level. 
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Table 2.3: Multinomial Probit, All Respondents 
Independent Coefficients for 
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Note: Perot coefficients normalized to zero. Standard errors in parentheses. ** 
indicates significance at the 0.05 level, * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 2.4: Multinomial Probit Without Uncertain Respondents in Candidate Place-
ment 
Independent Coefficients for 
Variables Clinton Dole 
Ideology -0.064** 
(0.029) 
Government Services -0.043** 
(0.014) 
Defense Spending -0.044 
(0.029) 
Aid to Blacks -0.011 
(0.010) 
Jobs vs. Environment -0.038 
(0.025) 
Female 0.044 0.149 
(0.196) (0.192) 
Age: 18-29 -0.938** -0.875* 
(0.410) (0.476) 
Age: 30-44 -0.899** -0.849** 
(0.315) (0.409) 
Age: 45-59 -0.373 -0.300 
(0.321) (0.322) 
Education 1.268 2.443** 
(1.107) (1.205) 
Democrat 1.345** -0.084 
(0.613) (0.636) 
Republican 1.315* 1.416 
(0.678) (0.895) 






Number of Observations 779 
Log Likelihood -392.508 
Note: Perot coefficients normalized to zero. Standard errors in parentheses. ** 
indicates significance at the 0.05 level, * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
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Figure 2.3: Vote Shares, Clinton on Government Services 
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Figure 2.4: Vote Shares for Clinton Without Uncertain Respondents 
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Chapter 3 Survey Measures of Issue Salience 
As discussed in the previous chapter, in order to examine the effect of heterogeneity in 
issue salience on election outcomes we must examine issue salience at the individual 
level. A simple and intuitive way to do this is through survey questions answered 
by each voter. Rather than estimate an average weight for the population and then 
attempt to examine the effects of heterogeneity on this weight, survey questions allow 
each voter to tell us how he or she weights each issue when voting. In this chapter I will 
examine self-reports of issue weights as a potential solution to the problems imposed 
by the homogeneity assumption. Unfortunately, I find that respondent answers to 
questions about which issues matter to them are too unreliable to give us any insight 
into how individuals are making their voting decisions. 
Earlier empirical research that has examined self-reports of issue salience has failed 
to consistently find salience effects among voters. RePass (1971) discovered that 
individuals who reported an issue as salient in response to an open-ended question 
were able "to perceive party differences on those issues that were salient to them" and 
that "salient issues had almost as much weight as party identification in predicting 
voting choice." Shapiro (1969) utilized a similar open-ended responses to measure 
issue salience and concluded that when attempting to predict candidate preference, 
"the salience portion of the calculus contributes positively to the overall prediction." 
Rabinowitz, Prothro, and Jacoby (1982) test issue salience in a model of candidate 
preference and find that "any issue singled out personally as most important plays a 
substantially greater role for those who so view it than it does for others." However, 
Hinckley, Hofstetter, and Kessel (1974) and Niemi and Bartels (1985) report that 
various scales upon which respondents can indicate the salience of an issue appear to 
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add little explanatory power when examining candidate preference in spatial voting 
models. Markus and Converse (1979) reach a similar conclusion when attempting to 
incorporate issue salience into a spatial voting model using responses to open-ended 
questions. The conclusion of these studies is that "issue salience, as measured in these 
studies, is of little use in explaining electoral choices" (Niemi and Bartels 1985). 
What accounts for these inconsistent findings? First, different survey questions 
were employed in each of these studies to measure which issues were salient to each 
respondent. It is possible that some of the questions used were more effective at 
determining issue salience than others. Determining which of these survey instru-
ments is most effective is the first step in employing self-reports of issue salience in 
spatial models of voting. Unfortunately, each of these studies also employs a different 
methodology to determine if these different issue salience questions improve our un-
derstanding of voter behavior. Without a unified methodology for testing the various 
measures of issue salience employed in surveys, it is impossible to say which, if any, 
are effective. 
The following section examines the survey questions employed by the American 
National Election Study from 1968 to 1996, the 1976 Patterson panel survey, and 
the 1968 Comparative States Election Project (CSEP) to measure issue salience, and 
discusses which types of survey instruments are most likely to accurately measure 
the weight a respondent places on an issue. Section 3.2 explains the model of vote 
choice that I use to test the different measures of issue salience. Section 3.3 presents 
the results of the vote choice models, comparing the results of models that do not 
attempt to account for issue salience heterogeneity with the weights provided by 
survey respondents to those that do. I find that for nearly every type of question 
employed in surveys, weighting issues in a spatial model of voting by the self-reported 
weights of survey respondents does not improve our understanding of voter behavior. 
However, the results of the unique question employed by the 1968 Comparative States 
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Election Project suggest that self-reported issue weights derived from questions of this 
type may hold some explanatory power. Section 3.4 concludes. 
3.1 The Reliability of Survey Measures of Issue 
Salience 
The questions employed by the surveys examined here to determine which issues 
voters found important can be grouped into three types. 1 The first are what I will 
call the open-ended questions. Respondents are asked which issue or issues are most 
important to them, and are free to name anything that concerns them (even non-issue 
concerns). Their responses are not limited to any particular list of issues. RePass 
(1971) utilized open-ended questions to measure issue salience under the theory that 
responses to queries about important issues were "measuring an attitude which is 
on the respondent's mind (salient) at the time of the interview - an attitude which 
presumably was salient before the interview and will remain so afterwards." A major 
drawback to utilizing this type of salience measure in a spatial voting model is that 
possible respondent answers are limitless, but only a limited number of issue scales 
that measure the positions of respondents and candidates can be included. It is quite 
possible that too few respondents will name the issues represented by the placement 
scales as salient with the open ended question to allow for statistical analysis of 
salience effects in a spatial voting model. Another type of question employed on the 
surveys I examine here I term scale questions. These questions are typically asked 
immediately following one or more placement scale questions and ask the respondent 
to evaluate how important they feel the issue represented in the placement scale is 
to them. Obviously, the scale question limits which issues a respondent can name as 
1 See the Appendix for the exact question wording of each of the questions employed in these 
studies. 
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salient, but measures of issue salience are provided for a large number of respondents 
on the available issue placement scales, facilitating the estimation of a spatial voting 
model. Finally, I examine the rather unique issue salience question utilized by the 
1968 Comparative States Election Project. This measure first asks a series of scale-
type salience questions for each issue placement scale and then asks respondents to 
identify which of the issues that were identified as salient was most salient. Obviously, 
this measure of issue salience is subject to the same limitations as the scale questions. 
Psychological experiments have raised concerns about the effectiveness of the two 
types of questions described above. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) review a number of 
psychological experiments that suggest that individuals are not able to discern what 
was salient when they made a decision, or at least are unable to describe what was 
salient to their decision. Most of these experiments exposed subjects to some stimulus 
that had a statistically significant effect on the decision to be made, and then asked 
the subjects what had influenced their decision. In many cases subjects did not 
accurately identify the stimulus that was known to affect the decision. Instead, many 
respondents named something as salient to their decision because it seemed plausible 
that it should be salient. Such findings cast doubt on the accuracy of survey measures 
of issue salience, as a respondent claiming that candidate positions on a particular 
issue were important to their vote decision may in fact be merely reporting a plausible 
justification for a vote decision that was made for other reasons. This could result 
in an overestimate of issue salience effects, as respondents could conceivably form 
a preference for a candidate without considering the issue positions of a candidate, 
and then place the candidate close to their ideal point on one or more issues and 
name those issues as salient to their decision. Brody and Page (1972) find evidence 
of this kind of rationalization. To avoid this I do not use respondent placements of 
candidates to measure issue distances; instead I assume that errors and rationalization 
in respondent placement of candidates are symmetrically distributed around the true 
37 
position of the candidate and use the mean placement of the candidate. 
Another concern exists for the scale measures of issue salience. Studies that di-
rectly examine the relationship between subjective (reported) and objective (actual 
or computed) weights on factors in decision making reveal that while the reliability of 
self-reported weights is greater than zero, there are often large discrepancies between 
the weights that subjects report placing on a piece of information and the weights cal-
culated (through statistical models) based on their decisions. Slovic and Lichtenstein 
(1971) review a number of these studies, and note that individuals tend to overesti-
mate the weight of low salience items in their decision rules, while underestimating 
the extent to which they rely on one or a few criteria to reach a decision. Thus the 
scale measures of issue salience are biased upwards for issues of little or no salience 
to the actual vote decision. All of the scale measures considered here display this 
type of bias. For example, the salience measure on the 1980 NES pre-election survey 
asks individuals to provide their rating of the salience of each issue in the survey on 
a scale from 0 to 100. On every issue more than half of the respondents provided a 
salience score of 75 or above. This tight grouping at the high end of the scale tends 
to mask any salience effects, as all issues seem to be salient to voters. Unsurprisingly, 
studies which have searched for salience effects using these types of linear scales have 
found little to report (Niemi and Bartels 1985; Hinckley, Hofstetter, and Kessel 1974; 
Markus and Converse 1979). 
A more fruitful approach may be to ask survey respondents which issue is most 
important to them, rather than asldng for salience measures on all issues. Most in-
dividuals appear to employ relatively simple decision rules (Slovic and Lichtenstein 
1968; Tversky and Kahneman 1974). One aspect of this hypothesized information 
processing strategy is to rely on a limited number of cues when making a decision. 
This in turn implies that individuals place most salience on one or a few dimensions. 
Therefore, examining the effect of candidate positions on the "most important" issue 
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on vote choice would be more likely to reveal a salience effect than the scale mea-
sures. All of the studies mentioned in the introduction to this chapter that found 
salience effects used some version of a "most important issue" question; the RePass 
(1971) and Shapiro (1969) studies utilized open-ended measures of issue salience, and 
Rabinowitz, Prothro, and Jacoby (1982) utilized the salience question in the 1968 
Comparative States Election Project, which asked respondents to select one of the 15 
issues represented in their issue placement scales as most important. 
Thus, if the self-reported issue weights of respondents do actually contain some 
information about how they make their vote decision, it is most likely revealed through 
what is identified as most important, rather than through reports about the relative 
salience of every issue in the survey. The open ended measures of issue salience in 
the datasets I examine here specifically ask each respondent to judge which issue is 
most important to them. For the scale measures of issue salience I simply code the 
issue or issues that are ranked the highest on the scale as most important. Thus, 
I am searching for an issue salience effect only on the issue or issues identified by 
the respondent as the most important. The next section demonstrates how I include 
these issue salience measures in a spatial model of voting and how to determine if 
these measures improve our understanding of voter behavior. 
3.2 Survey Measures of Issue Salience in a Spatial 
Model of Voting 
The spatial model of voting assumes each individual has an ideal point xi in a multi-
dimensional issue space X, which represents his or her most preferred policy outcome. 
Candidates adopt issue platforms Bj E X, and individuals determine their preference 
for candidates as some function of the distance from ej to xi. Thus, the utility yielded 
by candidate j to individual i is given by 
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(3.1) 
The matrix Ai is a matrix of issue weights; a standard assumption is that Ai is 
diagonal so that issues are separable. Further, voter utility functions are assumed to 
be symmetric around and single peaked at Xi, implying that the diagonal elements 
of Ai are non-positive. Estimating the salience of each issue in the spatial model of 
voting involves estimating the diagonal elements of Ai; as the absolute value of an 
element of Ai increases, more weight is placed on the corresponding issue by the voter 
and the greater is the utility loss when considering a candidate a given distance from 
his or her ideal point on that issue. Notice that the weight matrix is subscripted by 
i, allowing each individual voter to place different weights on each issue. This weight 
matrix is generally estimated under a homogeneity assumption, restricting Ai to be 
identical for all voters; with this assumption equation 3.1 can be simplified to 
(3.2) 
where the elements in the vector (3 correspond to the diagonal elements in A, and the 
elements in the vector Xij correspond to the distance between Xi and Oj. Estimates 
of (3 are estimates of the average salience of an issue. 
The survey measures of issue salience provided by each respondent can be used in 
a spatial voting model to allow for heterogeneous issue weights. If an issue salience 
effect exists and the self-reported measures of issue salience capture this effect, then I 
expect issues which are salient to the voter to carry more weight in the vote decision 
than issues which are not salient. Thus, if a respondent identifies an issue as salient, 
the element of (3 that corresponds to that issue for that individual should be larger 
in absolute value than for respondents who view that issue as non-salient. Thus, (3 
is likely an underestimate of the weight that an individual places on a salient issue 
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(and an overestimate of the weight an individual places on a non-salient issue). In 
this case the utility function becomes: 
(3.3) 
Dij is an indicator variable coded one if respondent i names issue j as salient, and zero 
otherwise. Thus, .:\ measures the additional effect that the issue distances of salient 
issues in Xii have on the vote choice. Since I am searching for an issue salience effect 
on only the most important issue or issues, the additional term .:\will generally only 
be estimated for one issue for each voter. If A significantly improves the fit of the vote 
choice model, then the survey measures of issue salience improve our understanding 
of voter behavior. Conversely, if equation 3.3 does not fit the data any better than 
equation 3.2, then the survey measures of issue salience tell us nothing about the 
choice rules employed by voters. 
Models of vote choice are typically set up as discrete choice models, where the vote 
decision is motivated through a random utility model. This means that equations 3.2 
and 3.3 become 
(3.4) 
(3.5) 
where Yii represents a latent variable that indicates the utility that individual i re-
ceives from voting for candidate j, and €ij indicates the unmeasured idiosyncratic 
elements of the individual and the choice. In practice, we do not directly observe Yij; 
instead we observe a discrete realization of this variable (the vote choice). We then 
estimate a discrete choice model; estimation of this model depends on the assumption 
we make about the distribution of the error term €ij· In this chapter I assume that 
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E:ij is distributed normally, and estimate equations 3.4 and 3.5 as probit models. I 
make this assumption because there are several three candidate elections among the 
datasets I examine. With normally distributed error terms I can estimate multino-
mial probit models, which are the most appropriate and flexible models in this case 
(Alvarez and Nagler 1998). 
To test the improvement that the survey measures of issue salience offer to our 
understanding of voter behavior, I use a likelihood-ratio test. If we define the log-
likelihood of the estimate of equation 3.4 as £ 0 , and the log-likelihood of the estimate 
of equation 3.5 as £ 1 , then the likelihood-ratio test statistic is -2(£0 - £ 1), and is 
distributed as a x2 variable with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restric-
tions imposed (all of the tests in the following section have 1 degree of freedom). 
The likelihood-ratio test offers a clear and rigorous measure of how much the survey 
measures of issue salience improve the fit of each model of vote choice. The next 
section applies the above methodology to a variety of self-reported measures of issue 
salience in an effort to determine what effect these measures have on models of vote 
choice. 
3.3 Empirical Application of the Survey Measures 
of Issue Salience 
The datasets I employ for the empirical analysis in this chapter are drawn from the 
ANES pre- and post-election surveys in every presidential election year from 1968 
through 1996, with the exception of 1992, when no question on issue salience was 
included on the survey. Thomas Patterson's 1976 panel study and the 1968 CSEP 
are also included. 
For each dataset I estimate two pro bit models of vote choice (one without the 
measure of issue salience and one including it), with the vote cast by the respondent 
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as the dependent variable. For the two candidate elections I coded a vote for the 
Democratic candidate as one, and a vote for the Republican candidate as zero. For 
the three candidate elections (1968, 1980, 1996) I estimate a multinomial probit 
model. 
All of these studies include a number of seven-point issue placement scales. Re-
spondents were asked to place themselves and the major presidential candidates on 
these issue scales. I measure the distance between the candidate and the respondent 
by the squared distance between the respondent's self placement on the scale and 
the mean placement of the candidate on the scale. I use the mean placement of the 
candidate to avoid the rationalization problem discussed in section 3.2. 
The issue distance variable included in the two candidate vote choice models 
is the average issue distance of the Democratic candidate across all issues minus 
the average issue distance of the Republican candidate across all issues. A positive 
number on this variable indicates that the Democratic candidate was further from 
the respondent on average than the Republican candidate. This variable should have 
a negative coefficient. For the multinomial probit models issue distance is included 
as a choice characteristic; the coefficient on issue distance represents the effect of the 
differences in issue distances across candidates on the vote choice. 
To test for the effect of the self-reported salience measures on the model of vote 
choice, I create a most important issue variable in the same way as the issue distance 
variable, except this variable only includes issues identified by the respondent as the 
most important. 
I also include a number of control variables. Party identification is a variable 
coded -1 for individuals who identify themselves as Republicans, 0 for Independents, 
and 1 for Democrats. Race is coded 1 for minorities and 0 for all others. Gender 
is coded 1 for women and 0 for all others. Age is merely the age of the respondent. 
Education is a four point linear scale. In the multinomial probit models I include 
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these variables as individual characteristics, meaning that I must normalize one set 
of coefficients to 0. In all three multinomial probit models I normalize the coefficients 
for the Independent candidate to zero; the left hand column in each model lists the 
effects of the independent variables on the choice between the Democrat and the 
Ind pendent, while the right hand column lists the effects of the independent variables 
on the choice between the Republican and the Independent. 
The coding of the variables in the multinomial probit model that examines the 
salience question in the 1968 CSEP is slightly different, for reasons that will be 
explained below. Race was excluded from these models, and party identification and 
age were broken up into a series of dummy variables (for Democrats and Republicans, 
and for ages 18-29, 30-44, and 45-59). 
I first examine the effect of the open ended survey measures of issue salience on 
the vote choice model. The 1972, 1976 and 1988 ANES studies included only the 
open ended measure of issue salience. The results of estimating vote choice models in 
these datasets both with and without a measure of issue salience are presented below. 
Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 Here 
Issue distance takes on the hypothesized negative coefficient in all three models, 
indicating that the basic assumption of the spatial model holds (voters tend to prefer 
candidates who are closer to their ideal point in the issue space). Party ID is positive 
as expected, and statistically significant in every instance. However, including an 
additional variable to add weight to the issue identified as most important does not 
improve the fit of the model. In none of the models is the coefficient on the most 
important issue variable significant. Further, the likelihood-ratio tests indicate that 
the addition of this variable does not statistically improve the fit of the vote choice 
models. 
The situation is no better when I consider the scale measures of issue salience.2 
2I also estimated models omitting the most important issue variable, and instead weighting issue 
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The 1968, 1980, 1984, and 1996 ANES studies all had some version of a scale measure 
of issue salience. Additionally, the 1976 Patterson Study also included a scale measure 
of issue salience. The models estimated for these datasets are presented below. 
Tables 3.4 - 3.~ Here 
Once again issue distance is negative and significant in all models. Party ID has 
the correct sign in all models (positive in the two choice models, positive in the three 
choice models where I compare a Democratic and an Independent, and negative in 
the three choice models where I compare a Republican and an Independent). Once 
again an additional variable that measures the additional explanatory power of the 
issue or issues identified by the respondent as the most important adds nothing to 
the vote choice model. None of these variables are statistically significant, and the 
likelihood-ratio tests indicate that they add nothing to the explanatory power of 
the vote choice models except in the case of the 1996 NES. For the 1996 NES t he 
likelihood-ratio test is significant at the 0.10 level, but both issue distance and the 
most important issue variable in the model that includes the measure of issue salience 
are statistically insignificant. Thus, even though the overall fit of the model is better, 
the substantive interpretation of the results would lead us to believe that candidate 
issue positions do not have a significant impact on vote behavior. Thus, even in this 
case the contribution of the salience question to our understanding of voter behavior 
is minimal, if not negative. 
Finally, I consider the issue salience question utilized in the 1968 CSEP. Based on 
the discussion in section 3.2, this is the type of question that would be most likely to 
elicit a true measure of issue salience, since it is focused on determining which issue 
is most important, rather than on a ranking of all issues. This measure also does 
distances by the scale measures. This is the same procedure used in many past studies (Hinckley, 
Hofstetter, and Kessel 1974; Markus and Converse 1979; Niemi and Bartels 1985). In every case the 
weighted model fit the data worse than the unweighted model. 
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not have the shortcomings of the open-ended questions, since respondents are limited 
in their answers to the available issue placement scales. Thus, I would expect this 
type of issue salience question to have the greatest possibility of success in discovering 
heterogeneity in issue salience in a spatial model of voting. The models estimated for 
the 1968 CSEP, one with the "most important issue" variable and the other without, 
are presented below. 
Table 3.9 Here 
As for the other salience questions issue distance is negative and significant in these 
models, and the individual-specific variables behave as predicted (Wallace supporters 
are more likely to be young, male, and Independents). However, the addition of 
a variable to measure issue distance on the "most important issue" has a significant 
impact on the overall fit of the model (the likelihood-ratio test is significant at the 0.05 
level). This variable is also statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Further, unlike 
the 1996 NES results, the addition of this variable does not cause the substantive 
results of other variables to change in unpredictable ways. Thus it appears that the 
type of question used in the 1968 CSEP did elicit accurate information about issue 
salience - the positions of candidates on issues that individuals identified as most 
important to them had a statistically significant impact on vote choice, even when 
controlling for candidate positions on all issues. 
However, there is one point of concern with these results. The sample size of the 
1968 CSEP is extremely large, especially relative to the sample sizes available for the 
other datasets. The number of individuals available for analysis in the 1968 CSEP 
was 5849, while all of the other models were estimated using 200 to 800 observations. 
Such a large sample will produce standard errors on the estimated coefficients that 
are small relative to the models that used less observations. Thus, the large sample 
size of the 1968 CSEP could be the reason that issue salience is estimated to have 
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a statistically significant impact on vote choice, rather than any actual relationship. 
To test for this possibility, I performed a series of simulations using the 1968 CSEP 
data. I first randomly drew a 10% subsample of the 1968 CSEP dataset. This yielded 
approximately 600 observations - about the same sample size used to estimate the 
other models. I then re-estimated the multinomial probit model that included the 
issue salience variable, and examined the estimated coefficients and standard errors. 
This process was repeated 100 times. In table 3.10 I present the average coefficients, 
the average standard errors, the number of times a variable was estimated to be 
significant at the 0.05 level (out of 100 simulations), and the average coefficient divided 
by the average standard error. 
Table 3.10 Here 
The average standard errors estimated on the 10% subsamples are larger than their 
counterparts in the model using all of the observations, as expected. Many variables 
that appeared to have statistically significant impacts on vote choice in table 3.9 are 
insignificant on average here (for example, the age variables). Notice that the impact 
of issue distance on vote choice remains strong, emerging as statistically significant 
in 96 of the 100 simulations with an average t-statistic of 3.36. Most importantly, the 
issue salience question also fared well, although its effects are not as strong as table 3.9 
suggests. This variable was significant in 4 7 of the 100 simulations, with an average 
t-statistic of 1.27. This is far more influence than we would expect to see from mere 
chance variation across the simulations. Although this is not overwhelming evidence 
that the issue salience question employed in the 1968 CSEP is truly capturing issue 
salience effects, these results, along with the psychological theories that predict the 




The utility of survey measures of issue salience in discovering heterogeneity in the 
impact of issues on vote choice is limited. Both the open-ended and the scale measures 
of issue salience did not reveal any issue salience effects. The open ended measures do 
not provide enough answers that overlap with the issue placement scales to estimate a 
salience effect in a spatial model of voting. Most surveys only have a small number of 
issue placement scales available for the estimation of a spatial model, yet the possible 
responses an individual can offer on the open ended questions are endless. In all 
three datasets examined here there is little correspondence between the open ended 
responses and the available seven-point issue scales. With so few respondents naming 
an issue for which a placement scale was available as salient, estimation of the vote 
choice model with the salience measure was nearly identical to estimation of the vote 
choice model without it. 
The scale measures of issue salience elicit salience judgments for all of the issues 
represented by the issue placement scales, but exhibit a strong upwards bias, with re-
spondents reporting nearly every issue as salient. Often, multiple issues were assigned 
the highest salience ranking, or identical high salience rankings. This introduced a 
great deal of multicollinearity into estimation of the vote choice model, as the issues 
named as most important were often a large subset of all of the issues included in 
the model. Survey respondents appear to have a strong psychological bias towards 
appearing informed to the interviewer, inducing them to indicate that they consider 
many issues when making a vote decision. Any type of scale measure of issue salience 
will reflect this bias. This interpretation is supported by the experimental psycho-
logical literature (Slovic and Lichtenstein 1971). Open ended questions are better in 
this respect, but are unlikely to provide enough useful responses to improve the fit of 
the unweighted spatial model of voting. 
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The results obtained using the "most important issue" question employed by the 
1968 CSEP are encouraging, if not overwhelming. Perhaps better survey measures of 
issue salience would allow for the study of heterogeneity in issue weights using these 
measures. Unfortunately, survey questions of this type are not generally available in 
most datasets on the American electorate, which instead employ the open-ended or 
scale measures. 
The failure of the most common types of self-reported measures of issue salience 
to improve our understanding of voter behavior and allow us to relax the assumption 
of homogeneous issue weights means that heterogeneity in issue salience must be 
examined by other means. An alternative strategy to directly asking voters what 
they find important is to infer it by examining their actions in a political context. 
The next chapter develops a method designed to do just that - observe the choices 
individuals make from among a set of candidates, and then determine which issues 
were most important to each individual when maldng those choices. 
3.5 Appendix 
These are the question wordings for the survey measures of issue salience employed 
by the ANES in Presidential election years from 1968 through 1996 (except for 1992, 
for reasons described above), the 1976 Patterson survey, and the 1968 Comparative 
States Election Project. The questions followed the placement of self and candidates 
on seven-point issue scales for the NES surveys of 1968, 1980, and 1984, and the 1976 
Patterson survey. They followed self placement on a seven-point issue scale and a 
question about the respondent's certainty about that placement in 1996. The CSEP 
question followed the placement of self and candidates on all seven-point scales. The 
open ended measures of 1972, 1976 and 1988 did not immediately follow or proceed 
the placements on seven-point issue scales. 
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1968 
How important was this problem [name of issue] to you in deciding how you 
would vote in the election for the President - the most important single thing, very 
important, somewhat important, or not very important? [code response]. 
1968 CSEP 
-
Now I'm going to read back the items you said were "very important" to you. I'd 
like you to tell me which one of the items is most important to you. [read back items 
and code response]. 
1972 and 1976 
What do you think are the most important problems facing this country? [code 
responses] Of all you've told me, what would you say is the single most important 
problem the country faces? [code response]. 
1976 Patterson 
Of these nine issues, which are most important to you, which are somewhat im-
portant to you, and which are least important to you? [Respondent is asked to place 
three issues in each category]. 
1980 
You placed yourself at point [position of respondent on 7-point issue scale] and 
what the government is doing at point [respondent placement of the Federal Govern-
ment on 7-point issue scale]. Using the blue card [which displays a 100 point scale] 
tell me: How important is it to you that the government continue/change what it is 
doing so that it stays close to/comes closer to your own position on this issue? [code 
response]. 
1984 
How important is it to you that the Federal Government do what you think is best 
on this issue of [name of issue]? Is it extremely important, very important, somewhat 
important, or not important at all to you? [code response]. 
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1988 
What do you think are the most important problems facing this country? [code 
responses] Any other important problems facing the country? [code responses] Of 
those you've mentioned, what would you say is the single most important problem 
the country faces? [code response]. 
1996 
How important is this issue [named in previous questions] to you? Extremely 
important, very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not important 
at all? [code response]. 
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Table 3.1: Vote Choice, 1972 NES 
Independent 
Variables 
Issue Distance -0.20** -0.20** 
(0.03) (0.03) 
Most Important 0.01 
Issue (0.03) 
Party ID 0.96** 0.96** 
(0.13) (0.13) 
Race 0.80* 0.81* 
(0.42) (0.42) 
Gender 0.55** 0.55** 
(0.18) (0.18) 
Age 0.00 0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Education 0.11 0.11 
(0.09) (0.09) 
Constant -1.02** -1.02** 
(0.42) (0.42) 
Number of Obs. 332 332 
Log Likelihood -129.60 -129.56 
Log Likelihood Test 0.08 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level, * 
indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 3.2: Vote Choice, 1976 NES 
Independent 
Variables 
Issue Distance -0.18** -0.16** 
(0.05) (0.05) 
Most Important -0.04 
Issue (0.03) 
Party ID 0.82** 0.82** 
(0.10) (0.10) 
Race 1.16** 1.19** 
(0.38) (0.38) 
Gender 0.18 0.18 
(0.15) (0.15) 
Age 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.01) 
Education -0.08 -0.09 
(0.08) (0.08) 
Constant 0.09 0.11 
(0.34) (0.35) 
Number of Obs. 384 384 
Log Likelihood -188.12 -187.34 
Log Likelihood Test 0.78 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level, * 
indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 3.3: Vote Choice, 1988 NES 
Independent 
Variables 
Issue Distance -0.30** -0.33** 
(0.06) (0.10) 
Most Important 0.01 
Issue (0.02) 
Party ID 1.29** 1.29** 
(0.19) (0.19) 
Race 1.21 ** 1.20** 
(0.49) (0.49) 
Gender 0.38 0.39 
(0.27) (0.27) 
Age -0.00 -0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Education -0.17 -0.17 
(0.14) (0.14) 
Constant 0.20 0.19 
(0.66) (0.66) 
Number of Obs. 210 210 
Log Likelihood -57.79 -57.71 
Log Likelihood Test 0.16 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level, * 
indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
54 
Table 3.4: Vote Choice, 1968 NES 
Independent Coefficients for Coefficients for 
Variables Humphrey Nixon Humphrey Nixon 
Issue Distance -0.15** -0.15* 
(0.04) (0.08) 
Most Important -0.00 
Issue (0.03) 
Party ID 0.65** -0.77** 0.67** -0.75** 
(0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.22) 
Race 2.59 1.06 2.67 1.13 
(1.26) (1.20) (5.32) (4.86) 
Gender 0.30 0.40* 0.33 0.42 
(0.25) (0.22) (1.01) (0.82) 
Age 0.02** 0.02** 0.02 0.02 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02) 
Education 0.43** 0.45** 0.44 0.46 
(0.16) (0.14) (0.36) (0.36) 
Constant -1.32** -0.85** -1.33 -0.84 
(0.40) (0.39) (1.63) (0.96) 
DHW -0.71 -0.83 
(0.89) (4.12) 
DNW 0.11 0.11 
(0.55) (0.89) 
Number of Obs. 784 784 
Log Likelihood -489.94 -489.62 
Log Likelihood Test 0.64 
Note: Wallace coefficients normalized to zero. Standard errors in parentheses. ** 
indicates significance at the 0.05 level, * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 3.5: Vote Choice, 1976 Patterson 
Independent 
Variables 
Issue Distance -0.20** -0.16** 
(0.04) (0.06) 
Most Important -0.02 
Issue (0.04) 
Party ID 0.80** 0.80** 
(0.12) (0.12) 
Race 0.22 0.22 
(0.36) (0.36) 
Gender -0.29 -0.28 
(0.19) (0.19) 
Age -0.01 * -0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Education -0.13 -0.12 
(0.10) (0.10) 
Constant 0.90* 0.87* 
(0.47) (0.47) 
Number of Obs. 272 272 
Log Likelihood -114.79 -114.56 
Log Likelihood Test 0.46 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level, * 
indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 3.6: Vote Choice, 1980 NES 
Independent Coefficients for Coefficients for 
Variables Carter Reagan Carter Reagan 
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Note: Anderson coefficients normalized to zero. Standard errors in parentheses. ** 
indicates significance at the 0.05 level, * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 3.7: Vote Choice, 1984 NES 
Independent 
Variables 
Issue Distance -0.16** -0.18** 
(0.02) (0.03) 
Most Important 0.03 
Issue (0.02) 
Party ID 1.09** 1.10** 
(0.11) (0.11) 
Race 0.24 0.23 
(0.33) (0.33) 
Gender 0.06 0.04 
(0.16) (0.16) 
Age -0.00 -0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Education 0.16 0.15 
(0.10) (0.09) 
Constant -0.81 * -0.74* 
(0.42) (0.39) 
Number of Obs. 438 438 
Log Likelihood -165.70 -164.85 
Log Likelihood Test 0.85 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level, * 
indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 3.8: Vote Choice, 1996 NES 
Independent Coefficients for Coefficients for 
Variables Clinton Dole Clinton Dole 
Issue Distance -0.11 ** -0.07 
(0.02) (0.17) 
Most Important -0.04 
Issue (0.11) 
Party ID 1.38** -0.39** 1.38** -0.42 
(0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.30) 
Race 0.87** 0.16 0.81 0.13 
(0.33) (0.21) (0.95) (0.20) 
Gender -0.14 -0.01 -0.16 -0.01 
(0.19) (0.08) (0.31) (0.13) 
Age 0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
Education -0.10 0.01 -0.10 0.01 
(0.10) (0.05) (0.14) (0.05) 
Constant 0.86* -0.05 0.85 -0.09 
(0.48) (0.24) (1.44) (0.14) 
8cp -0.11 -0.06 
(0.21) (0.33) 
8np 0.91** 0.91** 
(0.09) (0.11) 
Number of Obs. 765 765 
Log Likelihood -406.28 -404.89 
Log Likelihood Test 2.78* 
Note: Perot coefficients normalized to zero. Standard errors in parentheses. ** 
indicates significance at the 0.05 level, * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 3.9: Vote Choice, 1968 CSEP 
Independent Coefficients for Coefficients for 
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-0.40** -0.38** 
(0.03) (0.03) 
























0. 76** -0.24 ** 
(0.11) (0.09) 





















Nate: The issues used in this analysis were limited to the 9 issues identified as "non-
valence" issues by Rabinowitz, Prothro, and Jacoby (1982). Wallace coefficients nor-
malized to zero. Standard errors in parentheses. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 
level, * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 3.10: Reduced Sample Size Simulations, 1968 CSEP 
Variable 
Issue Distance 
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Note: Based on 100 simulations using a 10% subsample of the original dataset. 
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Chapter 4 Issue Salience and the Costs of 
Information 
The results of the previous chapter reveal that most attempts to determine the weights 
that an individual places on issues through direct survey questions will not succeed. 
The survey questions typically employed for this purpose produce answers that bear 
no relationship to actual vote decisions. For this reason it appears that the only way 
to determine which issues were salient to a particular voter is to infer which issues were 
important by observing the voter's candidate preferences. That is, since we cannot 
ask voters directly which issues are important to them when choosing candidates, we 
must observe which candidates they prefer and then determine which issue positions 
of the preferred candidates were most important to that voter. 
In this chapter I develop a method for inferring which issues carried weight for each 
voter in determining candidate preference. This method is based on the premise that 
if we are able to observe a voter make enough choices from among sets of candidates, 
we can then observe what characteristics the preferred candidates have in common, 
including which issue positions these candidates have relative to the voter's issue 
positions. If a voter consistently prefers candidates who are close to his or her ideal 
point on a particular issue, we may infer that this issue is salient to that voter. In this 
section I use the choices each voter makes in creating a rank-ordering of candidates 
and the characteristics of those candidates to infer which issues were salient to each 
voter. Rivers (1988) used this method to examine heterogeneity in the weights voters 
placed on ideology and party identification in the 1980 election. Here I will apply this 
method to data from the 1976 and 1980 presidential elections, revealing heterogeneity 
in the weights that voters place on issues and how issue salience is related to costs of 
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information. 
The next section describes a method of measuring issue salience for each voter 
using rank-ordered data. I then apply this method to data from the 1976 and 1980 
presidential elections in section 4.2, revealing a great deal of heterogeneity in the 
weights that voters place on issues when determining candidate preference. Section 
4.3 relates this measure of issue salience to a voter's costs of information. The greater 
the costs of information to a voter, the less likely it is that that voter will utilize 
issues when determining candidate preference. Section 4.4 concludes, discussing the 
implications of these results and the limitations of the methodology developed in this 
chapter. 
4.1 Measuring Issue Salience in a Spatial Voting 
Model with Rank Ordered Data 
Typically, survey data on voting gathers information on which candidate was most 
preferred by each voter (i.e., who each voter voted for), as well as information about 
the voter's perceptions of the candidates and the voters themselves. In this type 
of data each voter is observed making one choice, voting for a single candidate in a 
single election. Thus, when determining the impact of issues on vote choice each voter 
constitutes a single observation, as only one vote decision is observed for each voter. 
Empirically, estimating the impact of issues on vote choice with this kind of data uses 
each vote choice the dependent variable, and some measure of issue distance among 
the independent variables. The vote choice models presented in Chapter 2 are an 
example of this ldnd of empirical model. These models allow us to estimate the effect 
that distance on a particular issue had on preference for a candidate on average, but 
do not reveal the effect proximity on this issue had on the preferences of each voter. 
As explained above, failure to account for this heterogeneity has both methodological 
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and substantive consequences. 
These models assume homogeneity in issue weights in part because of the kind 
of survey data typically available. Observing a single choice for each voter only 
tells us that the candidate that voter most preferred had the most desirable issue 
positions overall among candidates in the choice set. We cannot determine specifically 
which issues were most salient to the individual voter and which were irrelevant. For 
instance, if a particular voter is both pro-life and in favor of a tax cut and this voter 
casts a vote for a candidate that is both pro-life and in favor of a tax cut, we cannot 
determine which issue positions of the candidate greatly influenced this voters choice, 
and which had no impact. However, if we were able to observe this individual voter 
over many elections, choice patterns might emerge that would give some insight into 
which issues are salient to this voter. For example, if over a series of elections this 
voter always voted for a pro-life candidate, even if that candidate was not in favor of 
a tax cut, then this would be evidence that the issue of abortion was more salient to 
this voter than the tax rate. If this kind of data were available, it would allow for the 
study Of heterogeneity in issue weights in great detail. 
Unfortunately, there is almost no survey data available that contains enough ob-
served vote choices for each voter to pursue this strategy. Elections are relatively 
infrequent events; the American National Election Studies panels span four years, 
and observe three vote choices per respondent at most (two for presidential elections). 
However, there is another type of data that allows us to observe multiple preference 
choices from among a set of candidates, even for a survey conducted during a single 
election. If preference rank-orderings of candidates by voters are available, they can 
be used to determine which issues are salient to each voter. To construct a rank-
ordering the voter must make a series of choices, determining where each candidate 
will be ranked. By examining the characteristics of the candidates and their position 
in the rank-ordering, we can determine which characteristics are salient in determin-
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ing candidate preference and which are not. To continue the example above, suppose 
a voter provides a rank-ordering of candidates that consistently ranks pro-life can-
didates above pro-choice candidates, but does not rank candidates in any particular 
order based on their positions on a tax cut. This is evidence that for this voter the 
abortion issue is more salient than the tax cut issue. 
In the remainder of this section I will first show how the usual survey data and 
estimation techniques employed in political science only allow for the estimation of 
the average salience placed on an issue in the electorate. I will then show how the 
use of rank orderings of candidates can be used to derive estimates of which issues 
are salient to each voter, thus revealing heterogeneity in the issue weights employed 
by voters when deciding which candidate to vote for. 
The spatial model of voting assumes each individual has an ideal point Xi in a 
multidimensional issue space X, which represents his or her most preferred policy 
outcome. Candidates adopt issue platforms Bj E X and individuals determine their 
preference for candidates as some function of the distance from ej to Xi· Thus, the 
utility yielded by candidate j to individual i is given by 
(4.1) 
The matrix Ai is a matrix of issue weights; a standard assumption is that Ai is 
diagonal so that issues are separable. Further, voter utility functions are assumed to 
be symmetric around and single peaked at xi, implying that the diagonal elements 
of Ai are non-positive. Estimating the salience of each issue in the spatial model of 
voting involves estimating the diagonal elements of Ai; as the absolute value of an 
element of Ai increases, more weight is placed on the corresponding issue by the voter 
and the greater is the utility loss when considering a candidate a given distance from 
his or her ideal point on that issue. Notice that the weight matrix is subscripted by 
i, allowing each individual voter to place different weights on each issue. Equation 
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4.1 can be simplified to 
(4.2) 
where the elements in the vector f3i correspond to the diagonal elements in Ai, and 
the elements in the vector Xij correspond to the distance between Xi and ()j· 
Models of vote choice are typically set up as discrete choice models, where the vote 
decision is motivated through a random utility model. This means that equation 4.2 
becomes 
(4.3) 
where Yij represents a latent variable that indicates the candidate that the individual 
chooses to vote for and Eij indicates the unmeasured idiosyncratic elements of the 
individual and the choice. In practice we do not directly observe Yij; instead we 
observe a discrete realization of this variable (the vote choice). We then estimate a 
discrete choice model; estimation of this model depends on the assumption we make 
about the distribution of the error term Eij· For instance, under the assumption that 
this error term is independently and identically distributed Type I Extreme Value, 
the probability that an individual with ideal point xi and issue weights f3i most prefers 
candidate j from a choice set C consisting of m candidates is given by: 
( 4.4) 
This is conditional logit, where the choice characteristics of the equation are the 
issue distances between the candidate's platform and the individual's ideal point. 
Equation 4.5 is the probability of selecting the most preferred candidate from among 
all candidates; typically this is the only choice information available in survey data. 
With only one observation per voter it is impossible to estimate separate issue weights 
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for each individual. Thus, a strong homogeneity assumption about issue weights is 
generally imposed, requiring that the elements of /Ji be identical for all voters, yielding 
the familiar conditional logit specification 
ef3' Xij 
Pr(jlxi, /3, C) = I: f3'X· 
kEC e ik 
(4.5) 
where f3 is a vector of the average salience placed on each issue in the electorate. Of 
course, models of this type ignore the possibility of, heterogeneity in issue weights, 
leading to problems both methodologically and substantively. 
A superior technique for estimating the impact of issues on vote choice would 
account for heterogeneity of issue salience across voters. Ideally, this technique would 
produce a unique weight for each individual in our sample, thus perfectly accounting 
for heterogeneity of issue weights across individuals. In terms of the model described 
above, this would involve estimating a separate /3 for each voter. 
In order to estimate /Ji we must observe multiple choices for each individual. If 
preference rank-orderings of candidates as provided by voters are available, they can 
provide enough information to determine which issues are salient to each voter, as 
discussed above. Rank-orderings provided by individuals can be decomposed into a 
series of choices, giving us enough information to estimate a separate vector of weight 
parameters for each voter, as m-1 choices must be made to construct a rank ordering 
of m candidates (Marschak 1959; Luce and Suppes 1965). 
To see this, suppose voters construct their rank orderings of candidates with the 
following procedure. First, the voter selects a most preferred candidate from the 
choice set of m candidates. Then, the next most preferred candidate is selected from 
the remaining set of m-1 candidates. The third favorite is selected from the origi-
nal choice set except for the first and second candidates, and so on, with the last 
choice being binary. If a voter provides us with a rank ordering of m candidates, and 
the m-1 choices that must be made to construct the rank ordering are statistically 
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independent, then the original rank ordering can be decomposed into m-1 statisti-
cally independent choices. Each choice can then be used as an observation, yielding 
multiple observations per voter. Chapman and Staelin (1982) refer to this process of 
exploiting the information contained in a rank ordering as "exploding" the observa-
tion, although they do not apply it to estimate coefficients for each individual in the 
sample. 
Two conditions must hold in order to decompose the rank ordering into m-1 
statistically independent choices. The first is that decision makers construct their 
rank orderings from top to bottom, as described above. Other possible methods of 
constructing rank orderings have been explored (Marschak 1959; Luce 1959; Luce and 
Suppes 1965), but ranking from most to least favorite is intuitive and simple, and 
thus I employ it here. The second is that each choice is statistically independent of 
the others. This assumption is more problematic, as it seems likely that there will 
be some correlation between choices in the rank ordering. This is another version of 
the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) problem, which is generally not a 
desirable property in models of candidate choice (Alvarez and Nagler 1998). However, 
IIA cannot be dispensed with here, as the simple decomposition of the rank ordering 
into individual choices depends upon it. 
For each voter, I model each of the m-1 choices made by the individual in con-
structing the rank ordering by conditional logit, making the probability of observing 
the complete rank ordering provided by the voter 
(4.6) 
This estimator is identical to successive applications of conditional logit, with 
each successive application estimating the probability of the particular choice from 
the choice set that remains once the choices made in previous applications are re-
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moved. As each choice is assumed independent, the probabilities of each choice can 
be multiplied to obtain the probability of the rank ordering. Provided each individual 
ranks enough alternatives, this estimator can be applied individually to each respon-
dent in a sample to estimate a separate /3 for each individual.1 The following section 
applies the estimator in equation 4.6 to data from the 1976 and 1980 presidential 
elections, revealing a great deal of heterogeneity in issue weights in the American 
electorate. 
4.2 Issue Salience and Heterogeneity 
In order to use the estimator in equation 4.6 I need datasets that allow voters to rank-
order a fairly large set of candidates. Unfortunately, most surveys of the American 
electorate are conducted within a few months of an election, which generally means 
that data is collected only on the two remaining viable candidates. However, panel 
surveys in election years begin interviews much earlier, when a relatively large group 
of candidates are still competing in the primaries. Thus, the early waves of panel 
studies will likely contain enough candidates in the choice set to allow estimation of 
equation 4.6. I use two panel studies from American presidential election years in 
the empirical analysis below. In 1976 Thomas Patterson conducted a panel survey, 
with the first three waves taking place in February, April and May, and June and 
July, respectively. In 1980 the American National Election Study conducted a panel 
survey, with the first wave interviews taking place in January and February of the 
election year (there was not enough data on multiple candidates to use the second 
wave, which took place in June and July). 
Neither the 1976 Patterson survey nor the 1980 ANES specifically asked respon-
1 How many observations constitute "enough" is still an open question. In the empirical work 
of the following section I only include respondents who ranked at least five candidates (yielding at 
least four observations per respondent). 
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dents to rank order the candidates in the choice set. However, rank orderings can 
be constructed from other questions in the survey which elicit the respondent's rel-
ative preferences for the candidates. In 1976 respondents were asked to place the 
candidates on a 7-point scale with a one indicating the respondent had very favorable 
feelings about the candidate, and a seven indicating very unfavorable feelings. In 
1980 a similar question using a 101-point scale was included on the survey, with a 
0 indicating very unfavorable feelings about the candidate and a 100 indicating very 
favorable feelings about the candidate. Rank orderings were constructed by ranking 
the most favorably evaluated candidate highest, then next most favorably evaluated 
candidate second, and so on. Ties in the rankings were broken randomly. 2 
Both the 1976 and 1980 surveys asked respondents to place candidates on a num-
ber of 7-point issue scales.3 A 7-point scale on ideology was also included. The 
distance between respondents and candidates was measured as the squared differ-
ence of the respondent's self-placement on the 7-point scale and the mean placement 
of the candidate on the 7-point scale. Issue distances were not calculated between 
respondents and candidates who the respondent could not place on the 7-point scale. 
I estimated equation 4.6 for each respondent who was able to rank at least five 
candidates for whom issue distances were available.4 Due to the limited number of 
observations per respondent (four to nine) I only estimate weights for a single issue 
2 A potential methodological problem with this method of constructing rank orderings is the 
tendency of respondents to place candidates about whom they know nothing at the midpoint of 
the evaluation scale, despite the presence of a filter question designed to prevent respondents from 
evaluating these candidates (Alvarez and Franklin 1994). This is discussed more thoroughly in 
Chapter 2. 
3In 1976 the issue scales were abortion, busing to achieve school integration, level of defense 
spending, government provision of jobs, level of welfare spending, and the distribution of a tax cut. 
In 1980 the issue scales were level of defense spending, level of government services, relations with 
the Soviet Union, and fight inflation or unemployment. 
4This non-random deletion means that the subset of the data used for the empirical analysis 
was slightly more educated than the entire sample (mean education was about two years higher), as 
respondents included here had to be willing to rank at least five candidates and place them on at 
least one issue scale. If anything, this property of the subsample used here would bias the findings 
of the next section downward by reducing educational differences within- the sample, thus malting 
cost of information effects across individuals harder to find. 
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at a time (meaning that /3 consists of a single element). 
Estimation of equation 4.6 yields a single coefficient for one respondent on one 
issue. These coefficients cannot be directly compared across respondents since estima-
tion of each probability in equation 4.6 depends upon the error term, which represents 
unobserved and idiosyncratic characteristics of the choice and of the individual, which 
undoubtedly vary across respondents. However, we can still learn something about 
heterogeneity in issue salience by examining the sign of the estimated coefficients 
for each individual. A negative coefficient indicates that the distance between the 
respondent and the candidate tends to increase as candidate rank increases. This 
implies that distance on that issue carried some weight in the construction of the 
rank ordering, as respondents tend to prefer candidates closer to them on the issue 
to those further away. Likewise, a nonnegative sign on the estimated coefficient indi-
cates that the issue did not carry any weight in the construction of the rank-ordering, 
as candidates closer to the respondent are not necessarily preferred to those further 
away (this follows from the theoretical assumption that issue weights must be non-
positive). Thus, a negative coefficient on an issue implies that the issue was salient 
in the respondent's choice rule, while a nonnegative coefficient implies the issue was 
not salient. 
Of course, examining the signs of each estimated coefficient does not rule out 
the possibility that the true value of the coefficient is zero and the observed sign 
is merely the result of statistical variation in the estimation. If this were the case 
we would expect to see about half of the sample with negative coefficients and half 
with positive coefficients. I test for this possibility for each issue with a one-sided 
binomial hypothesis test against the null hypothesis that the number of observed 
negative coefficients will be 1/2. Table 4.1 presents the negative, nonnegative, and 
total number of coefficients estimated with the 1976 and 1980 datasets, and the results 
of the binomial hypothesis test with the critical value of each test set to the p = 0.05 
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level. 
Table 4.1 Here 
First, note that for each issue more individuals are estimated to place weight on 
the issue than not. On every issue except one (busing for 1976, Wave 3) the binomial 
hypothesis test rejects the null hypothesis of zero issue salience in the population. 
Thus I can state with confidence that there is a clear relationship between issue 
distance and a candidate's position in the preference ranking. 
However, the large number of individuals who seem to find each issue salient is a 
point of concern. Issue information is difficult to use, which should limit the number 
of respondents using issue information to construct their rank-orderings and limit 
the number of issues used by each individual. Examination of Table 4.1 reveals that 
many individuals appear to use each issue. The number of issues each individual 
seems to find salient is also high. Table 4.2 lists the number of issues related to 
the rank-ordering of each respondent. Directly counting the numbers of issues each 
individual seems to find salient (in a similar way to the analysis of "issue publics" 
undertaken by Converse (1964)) is problematic due to the large amount of missing 
data across issues. However, by making the rather strong assumption that all missing 
data should be coded as non-salient, I can then tabulate the number of issues that 
each individual who provided a rank-ordering appears to find salient. 
Table 4.2 here 
Recall that seven issues (including the ideology scale) were available for the first two 
waves of the Patterson study, ten in the third wave, and five issues in the first wave 
of the 1980 NES Major Panel study. Examination of table 4.2 reveals that most 
individuals in the sample appeared to use at least one issue, and many were coded as 
salient on more than that. It seems unlikely that voters have the complex decision 
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rules suggested by these results. Correlation between the issue positions of each 
candidate across all issues is most likely responsible for this apparent overprediction 
of the complexity of choice rules. Any candidate with a coherent ideological stand will 
have highly correlated issue positions, and if the respondent also has fairly consistent 
issue positions, then it is extremely difficult to determine which issue or issues are 
truly salient to the individual, and which only appear salient because of the induced 
relationship between issue distance and candidate rank. To return to the example 
from the previous section, we would be unable to determine if a voter found pro-life or 
tax considerations more salient, even with multiple choice observations, if all pro-life 
candidates were also in favor of a tax cut. 
One interesting result is the increase in the number of respondents for whom 
coefficients could be estimated between each wave of the 1976 Patterson survey, even 
though the number of viable candidates was decreasing. More respondents were able 
to rank at least five candidates and place these candidates on issues as the campaign 
went on. In a similar vein, respondents appeared to use more issues to construct 
their rank-orderings as the campaign progressed. This is evidence of voters learning 
from political campaigns. As the political campaign progressed, more information 
became available to voters about the candidates, and more voters felt they had enough 
information to form opinions about their relative preferences for different candidates, 
and to place these candidates on issue scales. This implies that issue salience is 
related to the costs of information faced by a voter. Only with information about 
candidate positions on an issue can a voter use that issue to help determine candidate 
preference. Thus, candidate issue positions should be more salient to those voters with 
lower costs of information. The effect of the costs of information on the estimates of 
issue salience presented here is the subject of the next section. 
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4.3 Issue Salience and the Cost of Information 
As it is difficult for voters to gather and use information about the issue positions 
of candidates, I expect that the measure of issue salience developed in the previous 
section will be related to variables that measure a voter's costs of information. Indi-
viduals with lower costs of information should be more capable of using information 
about the issue positions of candidates in their choice rules. Thus I expect that there 
is a negative relationship between costs of information and issue salience. 
To determine the relationship between issue salience and the costs of information, I 
first estimated a series of logit models, one for each issue in the sample. The dependent 
variable in these logit models is coded one if an issue was calculated as salient for an 
individual (negative in table 4.1) and zero otherwise (nonnegative in table 4.1). To 
measure the information costs for each individual, I include independent variables that 
indicate how often the individual watches the nightly television news, the strength 
of partisan identification, the extremity of ideological position, education, race, and 
gender.5 I predict that as the costs of information decrease for an individual, he or 
she will find it easier to incorporate issue information into decisions about candidate 
preference and thus issues are more likely to be salient in that individual's choice rule. 
If the measure of issue salience presented here is actually a measure of an individual's 
use of candidate issue positions to help determine preference, then a relationship with 
a respondent's costs of information should be apparent. 
Exposure to information through the nightly television news and higher levels of 
education are both expected to reduce the cost of using issue information, leading 
5The television news variable is a 4-point scale in both 1976 and 1980, running from one (in-
dicating the respondent watches the national television news every night) to four (never watches 
the national television news). Education is a 4-point scale, with higher numbers indicating more 
education. Strength of partisan identification is a 4-point scale based on self-placement on a 7-point 
scale, running from zero for true independents to three for strong partisans. Ideological extremity 
is also a 4-point scale based on self-placement on a 7-point ideology scale, running from zero for 
absolute moderates to three for extreme right or left wing respondents. Gender and race are dummy 
variables, coded one for women and minorities, respectively. 
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me to expect a positive sign on these variables. I also expect strong partisanship and 
ideological extremity to have a positive effect on issue salience, as these individuals 
are more likely to be interested in the political process. I predict negative coefficients 
on the gender and race dummy variables, reflecting the higher costs of political infor-
mation faced by these subsets of the electorate. The results of the logit estimations 
are presented in tables 4.3 (1976, Wave 1), 4.4 (1976, Wave 2), 4.5 and 4.6 (1976, 
Wave 3), and 4.7 (1980). 
Tables 4.3 - 4. 7 Here 
Examination of these tables clearly reveals a relationship between costs of information 
and the measure of issue salience developed in the last section, especially for 1976. 
As predicted, education, strength of partisanship, and strength of ideology all have 
a significant impact on an individual's use of many of the issues examined here. 
However, gender and race are estimated to have effects opposite those predicted in 
1976 - women and minorities are estimated to be more likely to find many of these 
issues salient. This was not true in 1980, where these variables reflect my hypothesis 
that women and minorities face greater costs of information, and thus are less likely to 
use issues to determine candidate preference. Greater exposure to television newscasts 
had little impact on an individual's use of issues. 
The relationship between ideological extremity and issue salience is also of interest 
for methodological reasons. Since individuals with more extreme ideologies are also 
more likely to find issues salient, this means that there is likely a relationship between 
an individual's position on an issue and the weight they place on that issue. This 
means that for models that attempt to estimate the impact of issues on vote choice, 
the coefficients we are interested in are correlated with the variables in our model. 
This can lead to serious coefficient bias, calling into question the results of any model 
that does not account for this heterogeneity (Rivers 1988, Jackson 1992). 
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Another way to examine the effect of the cost of information on issue salience is to 
relate costs of information to the total number of issues an individual found salient. 
To test this I estimated a series of regression models. The dependent variable was the 
number of issues coded as salient for each individual, while the independent variables 
were identical to those in the logit estimations in this section.6 These independent 
variables are expected to have the same effect on the number of issues coded as 
salient as they did on the likelihood of each particular issue being coded as salient. 
The regression results are presented in table_ 4.8. 
'Table 4.8 IIere 
The relationship between costs of information and the number of issues estimated to 
be salient to each individual emerges even stronger here than in tables 4.3 through 
4.7. Education, strength of partisanship, strength of ideology, and gender all have 
statistically significant effects on the number of issues coded as salient in the expected 
direction (with the exception of strength of partisanship in the last wave of the Pat-
terson study). Exposure to the television news does not have a statistically significant 
effect, and race has inconsistent effects across the datasets. In light of these results 
and the earlier results in this section, I can say with confidence that a clear relation-
ship exists between costs of information and the measure of issue salience developed 
in the previous section. 
6The dependent variable ranges from zero to seven in the first two waves of the 1976 Patterson 
study, from zero to ten in the third wave, and from zero to five in 1980. With relatively few values 
possible for the dependent variables a natural question is whether the relatively discrete nature of 
these variables necessitates the use of a method other than regression, such as ordered probit. As 
this would result in the estimation of models with six to eleven categories, I chose to regard the 
dependent variable as continuous and estimate the model with linear regression. 
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4.4 Discussion 
The heterogeneity in issue weights revealed in this chapter has important substantive 
and methodological implications for the study of voter behavior. Although hetero-
geneity in issue weights is not surprising theoretically, few studies of the American 
electorate address this possibility. Failure to account for the differences across voters 
on issue salience means that we have an incomplete picture of the use of issues among 
American voters, and much of what is interesting about political campaigns remains 
obscured. Issue salience is determined in part by the costs of information. Individuals 
who face high costs of information are less likely to find any particular issue salient. 
These individuals are also less likely to consider multiple issues when deciding who 
to vote for. 
The heterogeneity revealed here has methodological implications for the study 
of issue salience in the American electorate. Most studies ignore the possibility of 
heterogeneity in issue weights, instead offering information on the "average" impact 
of an issue on vote choice. However, the strong relationship of strength of ideology to 
issue salience revealed here casts doubt on the findings of those studies. Individuals 
who are relatively more extreme politically also have more extreme issue positions 
relative to the population at large. This chapter has revealed that these individuals 
also tend to be more likely to find a given issue salient than the rest of the American 
electorate. This means that there is a correlation between an individual's position on 
an issue and the weight that an individual places on an issue. This correlation will 
induce bias in estimates of the "average" weight placed on an issue if it is ignored -
as it is in most studies of the use of issues in vote choice. 
Although the empirical findings of this chapter are valuable, the estimator used 
to obtain them has several serious limitations. Since a separate estimation must be 
performed for each individual in the sample, it is very difficult and time-consuming to 
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implement, and the estimated salience of each individual cannot be directly compared 
to the results for other individuals. Most importantly, there is very little data available 
that is suitable to the application of the technique developed in this chapter. A rank-
ordering over a large number of candidates is required, which limits us to surveys 
taken during the primary season when studying American elections. Most survey 
data on the American electorate consists of cross-sectional data obtained at a time 
very closely prior to or following an election, when only two candidates are generally 
viable. Thus, this technique is unsuitable for use in studying the great majority of 
survey data that is available on the American electorate. What is required is an 
estimation technique that accounts for the heterogeneity we now know is present in 
the issue weights employed by the American electorate, but that still remains :flexible 
enough to be used to study a wide variety of elections. Random parameters logit has 
these characteristics, and is the focus of the next chapter. 
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Table 4.1: Estimated Issue Salience Coefficient Signs 
Issue Negative Nonnegative Total p < 0.05 
Wave 1, 1976 
Abortion 135 90 225 Yes 
Busing 197 148 345 Yes 
Defense 233 129 362 Yes 
Government Jobs 209 108 317 Yes 
Tax Cut 217 135 352 Yes 
Welfare 250 175 425 Yes 
Ideology 383 162 545 Yes 
Wave 2, 1976 
Abortion 157 123 280 Yes 
Busing 260 221 481 Yes 
Defense 280 173 453 Yes 
Government Jobs 290 163 453 Yes 
Tax Cut 271 162 433 Yes 
Welfare 260 220 480 Yes 
Ideology 431 174 605 Yes 
Wave 3, 1976 
Abortion 215 171 386 Yes 
Busing 282 269 551 No 
Defense 337 206 543 Yes 
Government Jobs 344 181 525 Yes 
Tax Cut 296 209 505 Yes 
Welfare 312 205 517 Yes 
Foreign Intervention 290 240 530 Yes 
Law & Order 341 211 552 Yes 
Wage/Price Control 250 204 454 Yes 
Ideology 467 171 638 Yes 
1980 
Defense 220 112 332 Yes 
Government Services 220 124 344 Yes 
Inflation/Unemployment 173 114 287 Yes 
Relations USSR 201 143 344 Yes 
Ideology 268 91 359 Yes 
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Table 4.2: Number of Issues Salient to Respondents, in Percentages 
Number of Issues 1976, Wave 1 1976, Wave 2 1976, Wave 3 1980 
0 12.2 8.2 4.9 8.7 
1 22.3 19.4 11.1 25.6 
2 19.5 16.9 9.3 23.7 
3 13.5 18.3 11.7 18.2 
4 12.9 12.7 11.9 17.2 
5 9.9 12.5 14.3 6.6 
6 7.0 8.4 13.6 




N 615 656 700 472 
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Table 4.3: Costs of Information and Issue Salience, 1976 (Wave 1) 
Independent Variable Abortion Busing Defense Gov't Jobs Tax Cut Welfare Ideology 
Gender 0.45 0.28 0.51** 0.19 0.52** 0.09 0.09 
(0.32) (0.25) (0.25) (0.27) (0.25) (0.22) (0.21) 
Race -0.68 -0.20 -0.55 0.07 0.02 0.34 -0.16 
(0.46) (0.38) (0.38) (0.40) (0.38) (0.37) (0.35) 
Education 0.21** 0.12* 0.15** -0.04 0.02 0.09 0.23** 
(0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Watch TV News 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.02 0.33** 0.02 -0.22** 
(0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) 
Strength PID 0.24 0.14 0.01 0.41 ** 0.10 0.18 0.31** 
(0.18) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) 
Strength Ideology -0.27* 0.23* 0.05 0.27* 0.32** 0.08 0.44** 
(0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) 
Constant -1.08 -1.24** -0.59 -0.32 -1.04* -0.73 -0.99** 
(0.69) (0.52) (0.52) (0.58) (0.56) (0.48) (0.46) 
N 199 299 316 278 306 362 497 
x2 12.98** 13.29** 12.59** 14.77** 22.09** 6.47 45.78** 
Nate: Standard errors in parentheses. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level, * 
indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 4.4: Cost of Information and Issue Salience, 1976 (Wave 2) 
Independent Variable Abortion Busing Defense Gov't Jobs Tax Cut Welfare Ideology 
Gender 0.59** -0.11 1.04** -0.00 -0.25 0.30 -0.30 
(0.27) (0.20) (0.23) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) 
Race -0.12 0.78** 0.47 0.52 0.69* 1.12** -0.14 
(0.41) (0.33) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) (0.31) 
Education 0.25** 0.03 0.15** 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.16** 
(0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Watch TV News -0.10 0.19** 0.09 0.19* 0.12 0.13 0.03 
(0.12) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) 
Strength PID -0.24 -0.14 -0.02 0.07 0.23* 0.10 0.27** 
(0.15) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) 
Strength Ideology 0.28** 0.35** 0.33** 0.35** 0.13 0.46** -0.01 
(0.14) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) 
Constant -0.90 -0.55 -1.27** -0.71 -0.76 -1.44** -0.35 
(0.63) (0.45) (0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.46) (0.42) 
N 253 435 408 411 391 436 570 
x2 22.51 ** 26.17** 39.13** 20.16** 14.76** 38.66** 18.01** 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level, * 
indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 4.5: Cost of Information and Issue Salience, 1976 (Wave 3) 
Independent Variable Abortion Busing Defense Gov't Jobs Tax Cut Welfare Ideology 
Gender 0.26 -0.08 0.75** 0.23 -0.17 0.21 -0.11 
(0.22) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) 
Race 0.23 0.35 0.03 0.68** 0.54* 0.35 0.43 
(0.33) (0.28) (0.30) (0.33) (0.32) (0.30) (0.32) 
Education 0.25** 0.06 0.13** 0.10* 0.08 0.10* 0.11** 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Watch TV News 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.17* 0.12 0.06 0.01 
(0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
Strength PID 0.07 -0.09 0.03 0.03 0.23* 0.01 0.07 
(0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) 
Strength Ideology -0.12 0.23** 0.20** 0.28** 0.20** 0.18* 0.18* 
(0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) 
Constant -1.40** -0.48 -0.96** -0.76 -1.16** -0.62 0.10 
(0.55) (0.44) (0.46) (0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.45) 
N 347 493 482 476 453 465 601 
x2 17.00** 10.70* 23.99** 20.04** 20.67** 10.18 11.15* 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level, * 
indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 4.6: Cost of Information and Issue Salience, 1976 (Wave 3), continued 
Independent Variable Foreign Intervention Law & Order Wage/Price Controls 
Gender 0.42** 0.32* 0.36* 
(0.19) (0.19) (0.21) 
Race -0.26 0.15 0.16 
(0.29) (0.30) (0.30) 
Education 0.20** 0.04 0.02 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Watch TV News -0.17* 0.08 0.17* 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
Strength PID 0.23* 0.07 0.00 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
Strength Ideology -0.06 0.32** 0.20** 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
Constant -1.18** -0.51 -0.66 
(0.46) (0.45) (0.50) 
N 472 493 403 
x2 24.76** 16.33** 10.10 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level, * 
indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
84 
Table 4.7: Costs of Information and Issue Salience, 1980 
Independent Variable Defense Gov't Spending In:fl./Unemp. USSR Ideology 
Gender -0.02 -0.26 0.05 -0.24 0.08 
(0.28) (0.26) (0.25) (0.29) (0.26) 
Race -0.97** -0.04 -0.14 -0.70 -1.46** 
(0.49) (0.47) (0.46) (0.50) (0.43) 
Education 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.19** 0.15** 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Watch TV News 0.05 -0.05 -0.02 0.07 -0.11 
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) 
Strength PID 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.19 
(0.15) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) 
Strength Ideology 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.39** 0.51 ** 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17) (0.16) 
Constant 0.40 0.42 -0.02 -1.07* -0.23 
(0.60) (0.55) (0.54) (0.62) (0.57) 
N 270 285 279 243 357 
x2 5.39 2.99 2.59 16.31 ** 27.30** 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level, * 
indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
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Table 4.8: Costs of Information and Number of Issues Salient 
Independent Variable 1976, Wave 1 1976, Wave 2 1976, Wave 3 1980 
Gender -0.46** -0.36** -0.42** -0.51 ** 
(0.16) (0.15) (0.19) (0.14) 
Race 0.42 1.03** 1.05** -0.49* 
(0.28) (0.25) (0.30) (0.27) 
Education 0.41 ** 0.39** 0.61 ** 0.26** 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) 
Watch TV News 0.05 0.04 -0.06 -0.07 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
Strength PID 0.30** 0.19** 0.14 0.13* 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08) 
Strength Ideology 0.29** 0.34** 0.44** 0.26** 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) 
Constant 0.79** 1.21 ** 2.38** 1.68** 
(0.34) (0.31) (0.43) (0.29) 
N 524 593 628 383 
Adj. R2 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.10 
Nate: Standard errors in parentheses. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level, * 
indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
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Chapter 5 Heterogeneity in Issue Salience in the 
American Electorate 
Most studies of the impact of issues on vote choice assume that the weights placed 
on issues are homogeneous across voters. Estimating such a model tells us if an 
issue was salient to the electorate on average, but gives us no information about 
heterogeneity in the use of the issue. This homogeneity assumption is problematic 
from a substantive point of view, but until recently no methodology has been available 
that would allow for heterogeneity in issue weights. The previous chapter adopted 
the opposite approach - attempt to completely model the heterogeneity present in 
issue salience by estimating a unique coefficient for each individual on each issue. 
While such a technique will give us a great understanding of the differences across 
individuals in the use of issues, it is not generally applicable to the data usually 
available for study of the American electorate. What is needed is a model that allows 
the estimated impact of issues on vote choice to vary across individuals, yet still 
remain tractable for a wide selection of datasets and elections. 
The development of such a model can contribute to our understanding of hetero-
geneity in the impact of issues on vote choice, even if it does not completely describe 
this heterogeneity. To see this consider figure 5.1. Figure 5.1 represents possible com-
binations of issue salience and heterogeneity for a given issue. The "yes" and "no" for 
the columns indicate whether or not an issue was salient to the electorate on average. 
In other words, did candidate positions on this issue have an impact on vote choice 
on average? The "yes" and "no" for the rows indicate whether or not there was a 
significant degree of heterogeneity in the weight placed on the issue. Did all voters 
place about the same weight on an issue when voting, or was there a great deal of 
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variation in the weight placed on this issue? 
Figure 5 .1 Here 
Ignoring the possibility of heterogeneity in issue weights restricts the analysis of 
the impact of issues on vote choice to the top two cells in figure 5.1. If we estimate 
an issue to be salient and we assume homogeneity, then we are assuming that every 
voter found this issue salient. Likewise, if we estimate an issue not to be salient and 
assume homogeneity, then we are assuming that no voter found this issue salient. The 
homogeneous issue weight assumption is tantamount to assuming that every single 
voter behaves in exactly the same way. 
Allowing for heterogeneity in issue weights allows for a much more complete pic-
ture of the impact of issues on vote choice. We are saying two very different things 
when we say an issue was important to everyone, versus an issue was important on 
average. Was this issue something that concerned nearly everyone in the American 
electorate, or the focus of an intense subgroup? We cannot distinguish between these 
two possibilities without studying heterogeneity in issue weights. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section I discuss 
two assumptions we can make about the individual issue weights (f3i) I derive in the 
"ideal" model of vote choice in Chapter 1 to make an empirical model tractable. The 
first is the widely prevalent homogeneity assumption, which is embodied in most of 
the discrete choice models used to study voter behavior. This assumption requires 
f3i to be identical for all i. The second is a distributional assumption; I assume that 
issue weights are distributed among voters by some known probability distribution 
and estimate the parameters of that distribution. This assumption maintains that 
f3i is distributed across voters by some known probability distribution, and leads 
to a random parameters logit model. Section 5.2 presents the results of a random 
parameters logit model for the 1996 presidential election, and compares these results 
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to those from a conditional logit model with the homogeneity assumption. I show 
that random parameters logit contains all of the information that models that assume 
homogeneity do, plus I uncover evidence of heterogeneity in the weights placed on 
issues by voters. Section 5.3 concludes, and discusses some of the sources of the 
heterogeneity we observe in issue weights. 
5.1 Homogeneity, Distributions, and Random Pa-
rameters Logit 
Recall the "ideal" model of voter choice from Chapter 1. This model represents the 
probability that voter i votes for candidate c as: 
(5.1) 
With the survey data commonly available in political science this model cannot be 
estimated. Some restrictions must be placed on the estimated issue weights in order 
to estimate this model. By far the most common assumption about issue weights 
employed in empirical research is the homogeneity assumption. Rather than attempt 
to estimate a separate set of issue weights for each voter, we assume that all voters 
place the same weight on a given issue, meaning f3i = (3 for all i. If we maintain 
the assumption that the unobserved portions of utility are distributed independently 
and identically as Type I Extreme Value distributions then this leads to the familiar 
conditional logit specification. 
(5.2) 
This is an easy model to estimate, and most software packages include commands that 
will estimate models of this type. Thus conditional logit and its variants are popular 
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among researchers because they are simple models that yield some information about 
the impact of candidate issue positions on vote choice. Of course, the drawback to 
this type of model is that it assumes that all voters behave in exactly the same way. 
Thus, models of this type are of no use in studying heterogeneity in the impact of 
issues on vote choice, as all heterogeneity was assumed away in order to make the 
model tractable. 
What is needed is an assumption about /3i across voters that allows for hetero-
geneity in issue weights, while still leading to a tractable model. One possibility is 
to assume that the weight placed on a particular issue by voters is random, but is 
distributed among voters by some known probability distribution. That is, for issue 
j, /Ji rv f(/3jl/Jii O'f3J· Assuming a probability distribution f, our goal will be to esti-
mate the mean /Ji and the standard deviation O'f:Ji of this distribution. The mean gives 
us a measure of the average weight placed on the issue in the electorate, while the 
standard deviation will give us a measure of the heterogeneity in the weight placed 
on the issue. This assumption strikes the middle ground between estimating a unique 
set of weights for each voter, as I did in Chapter 4, and assuming all voters are the 
same, as I did in Chapter 2. This distributional assumption is the motivation behind 
random parameters logit. 
Consider equation 5.1 again. This is the probability that voter i chooses candidate 
c conditional on f3i· If we knew /3i for each voter the solution to equation 5.1 for each 
individual would be trivial. However, without this information estimation of equation 
5.1 will generally not be possible. If /3i represents the weights on Q issues, then the 
choice probability is conditional on Q random variables. Without some information 
about these random variables it is not possible to determine the choice probability in 
equation 5.1. 
However, if the distribution of the Q random variables is known then it is possible 
for us to determine the unconditional choice probability. I assume throughout this 
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chapter that these Q random variables are independently distributed. To obtain 
the unconditional choice probability of individual i choosing candidate c we must 
integrate equation 5.1 with respect to the Q independent random variables. 
(5.3) 
The intuition behind this estimator is actually quite simple. Let us assume for a 
moment that there is only one random parameter, /3j, and that parameter follows a 
known probability distribution f. Essentially, for each individual we are calculating 
the probability that that individual selects candidate c for every possible value of /3j, 
and weight the contribution of each particular calculated probability to the likelihood 
function by the density f. Thus, values of /3j far out into the tails of a continuous 
distribution f may produce very different calculated probabilities of selecting can-
didate c for a particular voter, but they will not carry much weight in the overall 
likelihood function. However, as a~j increases more weight is assigned to values of 
/3i that are further from the mean. This might improve the calculated likelihood for 
some individuals, since their particular values of /3j may be far from the mean. If 
enough individuals are far from the mean then this estimator will estimate a signifi-
cant standard deviation on /3j - this is how random parameters logit determines if 
there is significant heterogeneity in the weight placed on a particular issue. Thus, 
random parameters logit offers a clear statistical test for heterogeneity in the impact 
of issues on vote choice. 
Another useful property of random parameters logit is that it is not burdened 
with the IIA property that plagues conditional logit. Examination of equation 5.3 
reveals that the ratio of Pie to Pid for c :f. d depends on all candidates in the choice 
set. Because we are estimating individual-specific unobserved portions of the utility 
function, we are also estimating correlation in the unobserved portion of utility over 
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candidates. 1 Random parameters logit can approximate any substitution pattern that 
any other discrete choice model can estimate, depending on the specific specification 
of the random parameters logit model (McFadden and Train 1998). For instance, a 
random parameters logit model can be specified that will approximate the substitution 
patterns that could be estimated with a multinomial probit model (Brownstone and 
Train 1999). However, in the specific context of this chapter it is unclear how much 
of the correlation between choices is accounted for. Correlation between choices in 
the empirical application below is solely a function of variation in the estimated issue 
weights, and not of all portions of unobserved utility as it is in many multinomial 
probit models utilized in political science (e.g., Alvarez and Nagler 1998). 
To estimate the random parameters logit model we set up the following log-
likelihood function: 
where I is the set of all voters, C is the set of all candidates, and 
{ 




The log-likelihood function in equation 5.4 involves estimation of a Q-dimensional 
integral, where Q is the number of random parameters. This integral cannot be 
evaluated analytically since it does not have a closed-form solution. If Q is equal to 
one or two the integration may be performed numerically. However, when Q is greater 
than two numerical techniques cannot compute the integral with sufficient precision 
1To see this, rewrite individual i's utility for voting for candidate c as Uic = (3' Xie + 8iXic + C:ic· 
The unobserved portion of utility is 8iXic +c:ic, which is correlated across choices due to the common 
influence of 8i. 
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(Revelt and Train 1997). 
Since we cannot compute the integral numerically when Q 2 we must apply 
Monte Carlo simulation techniques to approximate the choice probabilities in the 
log-likelihood function of equation 5.4. We then maximize the resulting simulated 
log-likelihood function. 
The Monte Carlo simulation technique I employ here approximates the choice 
probabilities in equation 5.4 by computing the integrand in equation 5.4 at randomly 
chosen values for each /3iq· For each individual, for each random parameter, I first 
draw a random variable from the distribution I have assumed the random parameter 
follows. Since I have assumed that the random deviations from the mean weight 
placed on an issue are independent across individuals and issues, I generate a matrix 
of I x Q independent random variables drawn from the appropriate distributions 
(f(/3q) for the qth random parameter). I then compute the corresponding choice 
probabilities for a given value of the parameter vector B. I then repeat this process 
R times for the given value of the parameter vector. Let P[c(B) be the realization of 
the choice probability for the rth draw. I approximate the choice probabilities for a 
given parameter vector e by averaging over the values of Pi~: 
R 
A 1 ~A 
Pic(B) = R Li P[c(B) 
r=l 
(5.5) 
Pic(B) is the simulated choice probability of individual i choosing candidate c 
given e. This simulated choice probability is an unbiased estimator of the actual 
probability Pic(B), with a variance that decreases as R increases. It is also twice 
differentiable and strictly positive for any realization of the finite R draws. These 
properties are especially appealing because they imply that log-likelihood functions 
constructed with Pie( B) are always defined and can be maximized with conventional 
gradient-based optimization methods. 
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Thus, we construct a simulated log-likelihood function: 
I C 
SC= LLYiclog (Pic(e)J (5.6) 
i=l c=l 
The parameter vector e is the vector that maximizes the simulated log-likelihood 
function. Under weak conditions this estimator is consistent, asymptotically efficient, 
and asymptotically normal (Lee 1992). However, this estimator does display some 
bias at low values of R, which decreases as R increases. The bias is exceedingly small 
when R = 250 (Brownstone and Train 1999); most empirical work uses R equal to 
500 or 1000. 
The next section applies a random parameters logit model to the 1996 presidential 
election and reveals a significant degree of heterogeneity in the weights that voters 
place on issues. A conditional logit model is also estimated in order to show that 
random parameters logit reveals all of the information that conditional logit does, 
plus information on heterogeneity in issue weights. 
5.2 An Application to the 1996 Presidential Elec-
ti on 
To test the effectiveness of random parameters logit in the analysis of the impact of 
issues on vote choice, I applied it to the 1996 presidential election. The dataset I used 
was the 1996 National Election Study. 
In order to estimate the impact of issues on vote choice with either conditional 
logit or random parameters logit, we need a measure of vote choice for the dependent 
variable, and a measure of the distances between voters and candidates and issues 
for the independent variables. Vote choice was simple to operationalize - the NES 
included a question about vote choice in the post-election wave of the survey. For the 
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spatial issue distances I used the 7-point issue scales included in the survey. The NES 
asked respondents to place themselves and candidates on 7-point scales representing 
possible positions on an issue, with one endpoint representing an extremely liberal 
position and the other endpoint representing an extremely conservative position. I 
measured issue distance as the squared difference between a voters self-placement on 
the 7-point scale and the mean placement of the candidate on the scale by all respon-
dents. The mean placement was utilized to avoid possible projection effects, where a 
voter first forms a preference for a candidate and then begins to perceive that candi-
date as close to them on all issues. I examined five issues in 1996; general ideology, 
the level of services the government should provide, to what extent the government 
should help people find work, to what extent the government ~hould help African-
Americans, and whether the government should protect jobs or the environment. I 
also created dummy variables measuring each respondent's gender, age, and partisan 
identification. After eliminating missing data 717 voters were available for analysis.2 
I first present the results of a conditional logit model for the 1996 presidential 
election. These results are presented in table 5.1. Three issues are estimated to 
have a statistically significant impact on vote choice: general ideology, the level of 
government services, and jobs vs. the environment. These estimates imply that 
these three issues had an impact on voter behavior, while the government jobs and 
government aid to African-Americans did not. 
Table 5.1 Here 
While these results give us information about the average impact of issues on vote 
choice, they give us an incomplete picture of voter behavior. Taken at face value, the 
2The large number of respondents removed from the analysis is a cause for concern. Since the 
sample used here only includes those individuals who were able to place themselves on all five 7-point 
scales it is likely that removing missing data through listwise deletion is a non-random process, with 
potential implications for the following analysis (Sherman 1999). However, solving these missing 
data problems through techniques such as multiple imputation may actually make the problem 
worse. The heterogeneity in issue weights evident in this work suggest that attempting to impute a 
portion of an individual's decision rule is a dubious exercise at best. 
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results of the conditional logit model suggest that all voters were concerned with can-
didate positions on ideology, government services, and jobs vs. the environment, while 
no voters were concerned with candidate positions on government jobs or government 
aid to African-Americans. It is doubtful that any researcher believes that such ho-
mogeneity in issue salience exists in the American electorate, yet we are unable to 
determine how much heterogeneity exists in issue weights because this model assumes 
it away. Figure 5.2 represents this incomplete picture of the 1996 election provided 
by conditional logit. We can categorize issues by average salience (the columns), but 
we are unable to determine if there is heterogeneity in the weights placed on issues. 
Figure 5.2 Here 
The results of a random parameters logit model for the 1996 presidential election 
are presented below. For this model I assumed that issue weights were distributed 
normally across voters, and used 500 draws of f3i for each simulated maximum like-
lihood iteration. fJ represents the mean of these estimated distributions, while O/:J 
represents the standard deviation of these distributions. 
Table 5. 2 Here 
First, note that the means of the distributions for general ideology, government 
services, and jobs vs. the environment are all estimated to be statistically significant. 
This indicates that the means of the distributions in random parameters logit give us 
the same information as the coefficients in conditional logit. The mean of the distri-
bution of government aid to minorities is also estimated to be statistically different 
from zero; this could be due to bias in the conditional logit estimate due to het-
eroscedastic errors as discussed above. In any case, this estimate is not very different 
from the conditional logit estimate (which was significant at p = 0.13). Further, note 
that the coefficients of the random parameters logit are always larger in magnitude 
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than the corresponding conditional logit estimates. This is because the scale of the 
coefficients in logit models is determined by the normalization of the unobserved por-
tion of utility t:. In random parameters logit some of the utility that is unobserved in 
the conditional logit (and thus captured in t:) is captured by the standard deviation 
terms. Thus random parameters logit is scaled to an unobserved portion of utility 
that has less variance than that for conditional logit, leading the random parameters 
logit coefficients to be scaled up relative to the conditional logit coefficients. 
Second, a statistically significant degree of heterogeneity was estimated for three 
of the five issues examined here (ideology, government jobs, and jobs vs. the environ-
ment). Since the estimated standard deviations of the distributions of issue weights 
are statistically different from zero, this indicates that all voters did not place the 
same weight on these issues when voting. A more complete picture of the impact of 
issues on vote choice in the 1996 presidential election thus emerges, as pictured in 
figure 5.3. 
Figure 5.3 Here 
The estimated impact of these issues on vote choice can be broken down into four 
categories. The first, represented by the top left square in figure 5.3, is non-salient 
and homogeneous. These issues had no impact on average on vote choice, and there 
was little variation around this low weight across voters. These types of issues might 
best be described as "non-issues." No issues in this analysis of the 1996 election 
fell into this category. The second category is non-salient but heterogeneous, and is 
represented by the top right square in figure 5.3. These issues had no impact on vote 
choice on average, but there was a great deal of variance in the weight placed on this 
issue. For a small subset of voters these issues did carry weight in their vote choice. 
The issue of governmental assistance in finding work fell into this category for the 
1996 election. The third, represented by the bottom left square in figure 5.3, is salient 
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and homogeneous, which includes government services and aid to African-Americans. 
These issues were important to voters on average, and there was not a significant 
degree of variation in the weights that individuals placed on these issues. Thus we 
can regard these issues as key issues in the 1996 election. Since welfare reform and 
the fate of affirmative action were salient topics in the media at that time, it seems 
likely that these issues were prominent for many voters in the 1996 election. Finally, 
the fourth category, represented by the bottom right square in figure 5.3, is salient 
but heterogeneous, and includes ideology and jobs vs. the environment. It is not hard 
to imagine that some voters might find environmental concerns salient while others 
would not, but this result for ideology seems puzzling, since ideology often emerges 
as the strongest predictor of vote choice in spatial models of voting that assume 
homogeneity. A possible source of this heterogeneity in ideology weights is discussed 
in the next section. 
5. 3 Discussion 
One possible source of the heterogeneity in the weight placed on ideology is the 
unusual electoral context of 1996. 1996 was an unusual election in terms of ideology 
for two reasons. First, there was a third party candidate, H. Ross Perot. Although 
conservative leaning, he did not fit neatly into the ideological spectrum many voters 
were familiar with from two party races. Second, Clinton pursued a strategy of 
moderation in 1996, moving to centrist positions on many issues and away from 
liberal positions. These factors may have led many voters to abandon ideology as a 
criterion for their vote decision as the distinctions between the candidates grew less 
clear. 
Another possible source of this heterogeneity is the relative cost of using ideology 
as a voting criteria for different segments of the population. Many researchers in po-
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litical science have documented the higher cost of using issues when voting (especially 
an abstract concept such as ideology) for certain subsets of the population, such as 
the less educated (Alvarez 1997; Bartels 1986; Converse 1964; Popkin 1991). In this 
case individuals with lower costs of information would be able to place more weight 
on ideology, while those with higher costs of information would choose candidates on 
the basis of other factors. 
One way to determine if it is electoral context or costs of information that de-
termine heterogeneity in the use of ideology is to compare the estimates from 1996 
to results from a more "typical" year. I compared the 1996 results to the results 
from a random parameters logit model estimated for the 1988 presidential election. 
1988 was a much different year than 1996 in terms of electoral context. This was a 
two candidate race, and the ideology of the candidates was much more prominent 
in the media and more clearly differentiable between the candidates. Much of the 
election strategy pursued by Bush in this election revolved around depicting Dukakis 
as too liberal for the American people ("a card-carrying member of the AOL U"). 
However, we do not expect there to be dramatic differences in the relative costs of 
information to different subgroups in the electorate between 1988 and 1996. Thus, a 
comparison of the results between 1988 and 1996 could shed some light on the source 
of heterogeneity in the weight placed on ideology. 
The results of a random parameters logit model for the 1988 presidential election 
campaign are presented below. The data is from the 1988 National Election Study, 
coded in the same way as the data from 1996. 
Table 5.3 Here 
Of the five issues examined for 1988, four had means statistically different from 
zero, including ideology; two had standard deviations statistically different from zero. 
However, the standard deviation of the distribution of ideology weights was not sta-
tistically significant. This means than in 1988, unlike 1996, ideology was a key issue 
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in the election. To demonstrate the difference in the impact of ideology in 1988 versus 
1996 I calculated first differences in both years for the average voter in the sample. 
To do this I set the independent variables to their mean or modal values (with the 
exception of partisan identification), and multiplied these values by the estimated 
coefficients for the independent variables in each year.3 This gives the probability of 
the average voter voting for each candidate. Three different weights for ideology were 
employed in each graph; the mean weight placed on ideology, one standard deviation 
above the mean, and one standard deviation below the mean. Thus I calculate the 
probability that the average voter supports each candidate if he placed little weight, 
average weight, or a great deal of weight on ideology relative to all voters. Figures 
5.4 and 5.5 below graph the probability that the average voter would vote for the 
Democratic candidate (Dukakis in 1988, Clinton in 1996) as the candidate moves 
across the ideology scale. 
Figures 5.4 And 5.5 Here 
There are clear differences between figure 5.4 (1996) and figure 5.5 (1988). In 
figure 5.4 there are large differences in the impact of Clinton's ideological position 
on vote choice between the "low," "average," and "high" weight cases. For some 
individuals the ideological position of Clinton had a large impact on vote choice; for 
others it had little to no effect. However, in figure 5.5 there is little difference in the 
impact of the ideological position of Dukakis on the vote choice of the average voter 
between the "low" weight case, the "average" weight case, and the "high" weight 
case. This suggests that electoral context is responsible for much of the heterogeneity 
observed in 1996, as the relative costs of information to different subgroups of voters 
likely did not change much between 1988 and 1996. 
3 Setting all independent variables to their means or modes yielded a male Republican between 
the ages of 30 and 44. Changing partisan identification to Democrat from Republican shifts the 
probability curves in figures 4 and 5 upwards for ease of interpretation. 
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Figure 5.1: Heterogeneity and Salience 
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Table 5.1: Conditional Logit, 1996 
Independent Coefficients for 
Variables Clinton Dole 
Ideology -0.18** 
(0.03) 
Government Services -0.11 ** 
(0.03) 
Government Jobs -0.02 
(0.02) 
Gov't Help Blacks -0.03 
(0.02) 
Jobs vs. Environment -0.09** 
(0.04) 
Gender 0.03 0.15 
(0.31) (0.32) 
Age 18-29 -0.98 -0.90 
(0.61) (0.64) 
Age 30-44 -1.22** -0.78* 
(0.42) (0.42) 
Age 45-59 -0.41 -0.24 
(0.48) (0.49) 
Democrat 2.02** -1.07* 
(0.63) (0.59) 
Republican 1.41 ** 1.62** 
(0.66) (0.56) 




Nate: Perot coefficients normalized to zero. Standard errors in parentheses. ** 
indicates significance at the 0.05 level, * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
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Figure 5.2: Heterogeneity and Salience, Conditional Logit 
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Table 5.2: Random Parameters Logit, 1996 
Independent Coefficients for 
Variables Clinton Dole 




















Gender 0.05 0.13 
(0.35) (0.33) 
Age 18-29 -1.27** -0.96* 
(0.70) (0.67) 
Age 30-44 -1.38** -0.80** 
(0.48) (0.45) 
Age 45-59 -0.43 -0.27 
(0.54) (0.51) 
Democrat 2.46** -1.18** 
(0.80) (0.64) 
Republican 1.38** 1.61 ** 
(0.76) (0.61) 




Note: "fl represents the mean and 0/3 the standard deviation of the estimates of issue 
salience. Perot coefficients normalized to zero. Standard errors in parentheses. ** 
indicates significance at the 0.05 level, * indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
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Figure 5.3: Heterogeneity and Salience, Random Parameters Logit 
Heterogeneity and Salience, 
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Table 5.3: Random Parameters Logit, 1988 
Independent Variable 






















Age 18-29 -0.17 
(0.59) 
Age 30-44 -0.71 
(0.51) 
Age 45-59 -0.39 
(0.54) 








Nate: ~ represents the mean and O/J the standard deviation of the estimates of issue 
salience. Standard errors in parentheses. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level, * 
indicates significance at the 0.10 level. 
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Figure 5.4: Heterogeneous Effect of Ideology on Probability of Supporting Clinton, 
1996 
2 3 4 5 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
There are two major substantive conclusions to draw from this work. First, het-
erogeneity in issue weights is widespread in the American electorate. Different vot-
ers have different concerns and statistical models that address the role of issues in 
elections without considering this are misleading both methodologically and substan-
tively. Second, the heterogeneity in issue salience we observe is related to the costs of 
information that each voter faces. Individuals who are better able to gather and pro-
cess information about politics are also more likely to consider the issue positions of 
candidates when voting. I will discuss each of these conclusions and their implications 
in turn. 
The heterogeneity in the impact of issues on vote choice revealed here should come 
as no surprise. Most researchers would find the assertion that different voters care 
about different things uncontroversial. However, most empirical research in political 
science has ignored the tremendous diversity of the concerns of the American elec-
torate, instead choosing to focus on the effect of candidate issue positions on the 
aggregate electoral outcome. Models of this type do not tell us much about individ-
ual voter behavior. This was demonstrated in Chapter 2. Even when I corrected 
aggregate estimates of issue salience for voter uncertainty about candidate issue po-
sitions, the overall predictions of the model did not change significantly. In light of 
the obvious differences between certain and uncertain people in their use of the is-
sue placement scales, the failure to find any differences in the use of issues through 
estimates of aggregate issue salience once uncertainty is taken into account under-
scores the need for models that address the heterogeneity that exists in issue weights. 
Chapters 4 and 5 do address this heterogeneity. Chapter 4 reveals clear differences 
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across voters in the relationship between issue proximity and candidate preference. 
However, it is Chapter 5 that reveals with certainty the heterogeneity present in issue 
weights. Estimating standard deviations for issue weights through random parame-
ters logit gives us a clear statistical test for heterogeneity in the impact of issues on 
vote choice. Thus I have great confidence that heterogeneity in issue weights exists, 
and must be studies in order to completely understand the role of candidate issue 
positions in voter behavior in the United States. 
However, even models that concede that they paint an incomplete picture of voter 
behavior and instead attempt to estimate the "average" impact of an issue on vote 
choice are likely to be wrong. If heterogeneity in issue salience is correlated with voter 
issue positions, then any model which does not account for this will have biased coef-
ficient estimates, and thus a misleading picture of the impact of issues on vote choice. 
Chapter 4 reveals that there is a correlation between an individual's issue position 
and the weight he or she places on an issue - exactly the situation that will render 
models that assume homogeneity misleading. Therefore, studying heterogeneity in 
issue salience has methodological as well as substantive advantages. 
The source of heterogeneity in issue weights is also addressed in this work. Chapter 
4 clearly reveals many of the differences across individuals in the weight they place on 
an issue can be traced to differences in their relative costs of information. Individuals 
who face lower costs of information are better able to gather and process information 
about the issue positions of candidates. This in turn is reflected in the greater weight 
they place on issues and the larger number of issues they find relevant when voting. 
Further, I am able to relate heterogeneity in issue weights to the information made 
available in political campaigns. Heterogeneity in issue salience increases when vot-
ers are presented with confusing or contradictory information. This is presented in 
Chapter 5, which examined the differing levels of heterogeneity in the weight placed 
on ideology in 1988 and 1996. 
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Much work still remains to be done before heterogeneity in the impact of issues 
on vote choice is completely understood. Although heterogeneity in issue salience 
clearly exists, I cannot accurately determine the source of the heterogeneity without 
the kind of datasets used in Chapter 4. A major advance in this line of research would 
be to specify the standard deviations of the issue weight distributions estimated in 
Chapter 5 as functions of variables thought to affect individual issue salience. The 
results from Chapter 4 suggest that the cost of information faced by each individual 
would be a good starting point. Further exploration of survey questions to determine 
issue salience is also necessary. Chapter 3 revealed that most survey questions that 
attempt to uncover issue weights are ineffective, but the unique question employed 
in the 1968 Comparative States Election Project appeared to uncover some salience 
effects. As an effective direct survey question would be the easiest way to examine 
heterogeneity in issue salience, research in this direction could prove to be valuable. 
Finally, this work also has some implications for the political process in the United 
States. The costs of information to an individual plays a large role in determining 
if that individual will consider the issue positions of candidates when voting. Those 
voters who find political information to be costly are less likely to place weight on 
issues when determining candidate preference. This in turn has implications for can-
didate behavior in political campaigns. If candidates behave as we posit in the spatial 
model of voting, adjusting their issue positions to maximize their vote share, then this 
finding suggests that candidates will offer issue positions designed to appeal to those 
voters with low information costs, as these are the only voters for whom issue positions 
have an impact on vote choice. As these voters are primarily well-educated, male, 
and white, this suggests that candidates have incentives to take positions on issues 
that might systematically disadvantage certain segments of the American electorate. 
The serious nature of this implication underscores the importance of understand-
ing heterogeneity in the impact of issues on vote choice and its source. A complete 
111 
understanding of American politics is not possible without an understanding of the 
differences between its most basic elements, the voters. 
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